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REVISITING HOSANNA–TABOR V. EEOC:
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Ioanna Tourkochoriti *
The article approaches critically the balancing between freedom of religion and
the enforcement of disability anti-discrimination law followed by the Supreme Court in
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. Enforcing disability anti-discrimination law is a compelling
interest, as it finds a very strong philosophical justification, making thus the result of the
case contrary to the philosophical conception of a well-ordered society. Doing away
with the social construct of disability is a compelling interest as it is a universalisable
interest, an interest upon which there can be an overlapping consensus independently of
a person’s comprehensive, religious or not, vision of the good. Reference to the ministerial exception to justify exempting employers from the disability antiretaliation laws is of
doubtful compatibility with Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith. 1
Courts can distinguish between a doctrinal and a nondoctrinal issue and abstain from
controlling the first while controlling the legality of nondoctrinal issues. If the case of a
qualified minister is at stake, whose substantive qualifications the courts cannot control
under the First Amendment, then disability anti-discrimination law should be enforced,
as it is neutral law of general applicability.
INTRODUCTION
Should religious ministers who develop an ailment at a moment subsequent to their
appointment by a religious institution and become thus disabled, be protected by disability anti-discrimination law? The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided negatively in the
famous case Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. 2 Balancing between the competing rights of freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and the rights of the disabled to equal treatment, the Supreme Court gave the advantage to freedom of religion. The case raises concerns of justice, as well as of fit with
legal precedents. This article attempts to suggest a different perspective, stressing the
importance of disability anti-discrimination law and proposing an interpretation of the

* Labor and Worklife Program Fellow, Harvard Law School. Ph.D, E.H.E.S.S.- Paris, L.L.M. Université
Panthéon – Assas, Paris II, M.A., E.H.E.S.S.- Paris, L.L.B. (four-year program) Athens Law School. The author would like to thank Catherine McCauliff, Sanford Levinson, Nicolas Prevelakis, Bonnie Talbert, Michael
Stein, David Strauss, Winnifred Sullivan, Mark Tushnet, Carla Yumatle, and the participants in the Second
Annual Conference of the Berkeley Comparative Anti-discrimination Law Study Group, Berkeley Law School,
April 2013, for comments and suggestions on previous drafts.
1. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
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ministerial exception that would be in harmony with anti-discrimination law. If no doctrinal issue is at stake, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) must be enforced to
protect ministers from accidents or illnesses that appear at some point in their lives.
Lutheran elementary school teacher Cheryl Perich developed narcolepsy and began
the 2004-2005 year on disability leave. 3 In January 2005, she notified the school principal that she would be able to report to work in February. 4 The principal responded that
the school had already contracted with a lay teacher to fill Perich’s position for the remainder of the school year, and the congregation offered to pay a portion of Perich’s
health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. 5 Perich
refused, presenting a note from her doctor stating that she would be able to return to
work on February 22. 6 In February, she presented herself at the school reporting to work,
and when the principal told her that she would likely be fired, she responded that she intended to assert her legal rights under anti-discrimination law. 7 She was thus terminated
for “insubordination and disruptive behavior,” as well as for damaging her “working relationship” with the school by “threatening to take legal action.” 8 Perich filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which brought suit
against Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening
to file an ADA lawsuit. 9 As the Court noted, “[t]he ADA prohibits an employer from
discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 10 It also prohibits
employers from retaliating against employees who assert their legal rights. 11 Perich
sought “reinstatement to her former position (or frontpay in lieu thereof), along with
backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and other injunctive relief.” 12 Hosanna-Tabor argued that the suit was barred by the First Amendment, invoking
also what is known as the “ministerial exception.” 13 The district court granted summary
judgment in Hosanna-Tabor’s favor, dismissing Perich’s claim based on a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction not reaching the merits of the claim. 14 The Sixth Circuit vacated and
remanded. 15 The court concluded that Perich did not qualify as a “minister” under the
exception, because her duties as a called teacher were identical to her duties as a lay
teacher. 16 The Supreme Court reversed. 17

3. Id. at 699-700.
4. Id. at 700.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
8. Id.
9. Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter ADA], 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.
Ct. at 701.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1990); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.
12. Hosanna Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778-81 (6th Cir. 2010)
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. 2012).
17. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
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The case appeared as a retaliation lawsuit. Late in the litigation, the church defended its position as a religious decision. 18 Although the Lutheran Church expressed its
commitment to the anti-discrimination laws in the school’s employment manual, 19 it argued that Perich was terminated because of her threat to exercise the rights recognized to
her by the ADA; that is, to file a lawsuit against the church in a civil court, “contravened
the Lutheran doctrine that disputes among Christians should be resolved internally without resort to the civil court system and all the legal wrangling it entails.” 20 The question
thus emerges whether religious dogma can be invoked to negate the exercise of a legally
recognized right, a right recognized in order to protect exactly from the arbitrariness of
an employer regardless of whether that employer is a religious institution. Is the termination of a wholly qualified minister, according to the uncontrollable religious requirements of the church, lawful when she asserts the exercise of her ADA rights?
A number of commentators of the case focused on the priority of freedom of religion in the American constitutional scheme. 21 References to the history of religious freedom in the United States serve to underline the need to protect this liberty to the detriment of disability rights. This article argues that this reference to the history of freedom
of religion is misplaced and irrelevant to the crucial questions raised by Hosanna-Tabor.
The historical arguments are based on a selective decontextualized reference to the philosophy of the founding era, which is not plausible for disability anti-discrimination law.
The fear of eighteenth century state intervention to the self-government of the churches
cannot be paralleled and compared to the state enforcement of disability antidiscrimination laws of the twenty-first century.
This article makes two arguments. Firstly, the thesis of this article is that reference
to the ministerial exception to justify exempting employers from the antiretaliation laws
is contrary to the idea of the rule of law. 22 The first part of the article shows that the case
is not compatible with Smith. 23 Secondly, the result of Hosanna-Tabor is contrary to the
philosophical conception of a well-ordered society. Given that disability is a social construct, as part two of the article shows, doing away with it is a compelling interest. This

18. Leslie Griffin, Religious Freedom Defeats Secular Law, THE IMMANENT FRAME (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:06
PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/01/19/religious-freedom-defeats-secular-law/ [hereinafter Griffin, Religious
Freedom].
19. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 782.
20. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 715 (Alito and Kagan, JJ., concurring).
21. Thomas C. Berg, et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 973 (2012); Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 839, 848-50 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 821, 827-30 (2012); see generally Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 493 (2012) (focusing on the need to define properly the religious institutions which should be allowed to refer to the ministerial exemption in order to escape the application of anti-discrimination laws); and
Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 289 (2012).
22. Cf. Leslie Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Griffin,
Sins of Hosanna-Tabor]. In the same spirit, see Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine and the Public Good, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1099 (2004); and MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:
RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005).
23. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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is all the more the case in Hosanna-Tabor, where it is possible and easy to distinguish
between a doctrinal matter, which is uncontrollable by the courts, and the enforcement of
disability anti-discrimination laws.
As argued below, doing away with the social construct of disability is a compelling
interest as it is a universalisable interest. 24 This is the case because it is an interest upon
which there can be an overlapping consensus independently of a person’s comprehensive, religious or not, vision of the good. As this article asserts, for philosophical reasons
grounded within liberalism, enforcing disability anti-discrimination law is a universal
compelling interest, which means that the autonomy of the religious institutions ends
where ADA rights begin. Similarly, access to courts in order to have a person’s legally
protected rights enforced is a right protected by the U.S. Constitution. 25 It must also be
recognized for all employees independently of the quality of their employer. Accepting
that the freedom of religious institutions outweighs the right to access the courts means
permitting religions to overstep the boundaries that allow peaceful coexistence in the
public sphere. 26 As discussed below, access to courts is a right, which reasonable comprehensive doctrines can agree to protect, as it pertains to the fundamental elements of
political and social cooperation. 27
This article proposes a broad definition of the ministerial exception concerning the
employees to whom it applies by allowing the churches to define, according to their own
criteria, who qualifies as a minister. At the same time, the article proposes a narrow definition of the ministerial exception concerning the cases upon which it applies. The exception must apply only to the substantive qualifications of religious ministers, which the
courts are not competent to decide. When a case of discrimination emerges against a
minister, which is not justified in reference to a religious doctrine, then antidiscrimination law must be enforced. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 28 and some
commentators 29 have tried to defend the application of disability anti-discrimination law
in Hosanna-Tabor by defining narrowly the ministerial exception in reference to the duties of the church employee. They have thus attempted to exclude Perich from the category of religious minister. 30 This article adopts the position that religious institutions
should be allowed to define for themselves who qualifies as a minister, as the HosannaTabor Court ruled. Since the choice of the ministers is an element at the core of the Free
Exercise Clause, 31 churches should be allowed to determine who among their employees
has duties inside their organization which concern the transmission of their religious

24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
28. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) rev’d,
132 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. 2012).
29. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
Sch. v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 96 (2011) [hereinafter Corbin, Irony of Hosanna-Tabor].
30. See id. at 102.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
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messages, free from the judgment of the secular courts. However, disability antidiscrimination law should also apply to ministers if they substantively qualify as such.
The Hosanna-Tabor decision as it stands leads to the result that a religious minister who,
for example, develops an inability to move due to an accident or illness, can be terminated by his church without enjoying the protection of disability anti-discrimination law.
This article asserts that this is a result which is against the law, as well as the conception of a liberal, well-ordered society. In order to accord proper consideration to religious freedom, the article distinguishes discrimination on the grounds of disability, as
compared with discrimination on other grounds, such as gender. It is highly unlikely that
the discrimination on the grounds of disability will ever appear as supported by the internal dogma of a religious institution. 32 This is all the more obvious in cases of termination
of a substantively qualified minister like Perich. The church of Hosanna-Tabor had accepted the application of anti-discrimination law in regulating its relations with its employees, as is obvious from the personnel manual of the church. 33 This article contributes
to the existing literature in favor of a narrow ministerial exception, 34 proposing a nuanced way of defining its scope. It also provides a strong legal and philosophical justification in favor of this narrow conception, which does not exist in previous analyses of
the topic. For reasons grounded within liberalism, it is possible to reconcile the autonomy of the churches with the need to promote anti-discrimination goals (especially concerning disability) on the basis of a sophisticated interpretation of the ministerial exception. This article also offers a comparative perspective on how the exception is
understood in France.
Accommodating between freedom of religion and the need to enforce antidiscrimination law is a genuine dilemma. It is a hard case that implies the choice between two normative claims equally important in a well-ordered democratic society that
respects human dignity. A conflict of two civil rights is at stake, each one having its own
distinctive history and importance for the American constitutional scheme. 35 Freedom of
religion is a constitutional value, which prima facie is as important as the social and political integration of the disabled. Inevitably, the use of state constraint is implied in both
cases: if the state respects freedom of religion, it enforces discriminatory attitudes; if it

32. Cf. Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2011).
33. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 782. (“[The] LCMS personnel manual, which includes EEOC policy, and
the Governing Manual for Lutheran Schools clearly contemplate that teachers are protected by employment
discrimination and contract laws.”).
34. Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2001);
Sarah Fulton, Petruska v. Gannon University: A Crack in the Stained Glass Ceiling, 14 WM & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 197 (2007); Lauren P. Heller, Modifying the Ministerial Exception: Providing Ministers with a
Remedy for Employment Discrimination under Title VII while Maintaining First Amendment Protections of
Religious Freedom, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2007); Benton C. Martin, Note, Protecting Preachers from
Prejudice: Methods for Improving Analysis of the Ministerial Exception to Title VII, 59 EMORY L.J. 1297
(2010); Elizabeth R. Pozolo, Note, One Step Forward, One Step Back: Why the Third Circuit Got It Right the
First Time in Petruska v. Gannon University, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2008); Jessica R. Vartanian,
Note, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices by Religious Employers and Justifications for a
More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1049 (2009).
35. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt From Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781,
786 (2007).
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enforces anti-discrimination law, it violates freedom of religion. In this case, however,
the power dynamics favors the churches, and state intervention is required to protect the
employee as the weaker party. Although religious institutions are entitled to practice
their religion against the power of the state, they are themselves exercising power upon
their employees. This intervention should be very careful and artfully circumscribed in
order not to violate freedom of religion more than is necessary in order to promote antidiscrimination goals. An accommodation of the two competing principles is possible. 36
There are legal instruments which can assure that the right not to be discriminated
against can be protected in a form that minimizes the impact upon freedom of religion
protected by the Establishment Clause. This can be achieved by tracing properly the line
between what is a doctrinal question, not controllable by courts, and what is a nondoctrinal question, which is controllable. It can also be achieved by granting compensation,
and not imposing reinstatement of the person discriminated against on unlawful grounds.
The Court could have awarded frontpay to Perich without imposing her reinstatement.
The first part of this article proposes ways of tracing properly the distinction between doctrinal and nondoctrinal matters in order to limit the scope of the ministerial exception as it is currently being understood and applied by courts. It aims also at pointing
out inconsistencies with Supreme Court precedents. It contains a criticism of HosannaTabor in light of Smith. 37 Freedom of expressive association of the church when the
church is concerned as an employer is not at stake when a doctrinal issue is not under
consideration. The second part of this article analyzes the purpose and the philosophical
justification of the ADA to stress that the integration of the “disabled” is a compelling
interest. This article argues that defending the social integration of the “disabled” means
protecting a minority social group from the power of the majority, a concern which is
omnipresent in the American constitutional scheme ever since the foundation of the
American republic.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The result reached by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor is in tension with Smith. 38 The
solution to the problem at stake in Hosanna-Tabor is far from being obvious given that
the “ministerial exception” as it has been elaborated by courts is an important consequence of freedom of religion assuring the effectiveness of its protection. The crucial
question is how the scope of the exception should be interpreted. The exception must
cover only issues of substantive doctrinal qualifications of the minister. The enforcement
of disability anti-discrimination law can be done in a way that does not violate freedom
of religion, as courts can distinguish between a doctrinal substantive question, which is
uncontrollable on the basis of the First Amendment, and a nontheological issue pertaining to the enforcement of disability civil rights. Perich’s substantive competence to serve

36. Cf. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Amos: Religious Autonomy and the Moral Uses of Pluralism, in
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST
DEMOCRACIES 165 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).
37. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38. Id.
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as a minister was not at stake. Even if Perich’s claim is important and must be protected,
there are legal tools which can assure a harmonious exercise between her right to have
the ADA enforced, and the right of the church to not have an unwanted minister. Ordering damages instead of restitution is a way of recognizing the important value of the two
competing claims. Given that disability is a social construct, 39 doing away with this social construct is a compelling universalizable interest. 40 When it is possible and easy to
distinguish between a doctrinal matter, which is uncontrollable by the courts, and the enforcement of disability anti-discrimination law, as in Hosanna-Tabor, then it does not
make sense to talk about the ministerial exception at all.
A.

Problems of scope

Hosanna-Tabor raises important issues concerning freedom of religion and the autonomy of religious institutions in the appointment of their ministers. In some cases, it is
possible for courts to distinguish between a religious doctrinal issue which is beyond the
control of the courts, and a nonreligious one in the appointment of their ministers. When
this is possible, the ADA must be enforced for ministers as well, in order to protect them
from discrimination on the grounds of disability.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for an exception to the general
principle against discrimination for religious employers. 41 Employers are allowed to use
religion, sex, or national origin as a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”)
whenever “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.” 42 The ADA also recognizes a defense for religious institutions for discriminating in the appointment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con-

39. See infra part II.A.
40. See infra part II.B.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 1(a):
Inapplicability of subchapter to certain aliens and employees of religious entities. This
subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution,
or society of its activities.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment
agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to
classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an
employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any
such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. (2) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular
religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution
of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed
by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or
if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
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nected with the carrying on of their activities. 43
In parallel, courts have elaborated an exception to anti-discrimination laws for religious organizations according to which they may be exempted from the application of
anti-discrimination laws in the choice of their clergy and similar religious leaders. 44 The
Civil Rights Act exceptions are narrower and concern only religious discrimination for
any employee of a religious organization or school, compared to this second ministerial
exception which applies to any kind of discrimination with narrow application—only the
clergy. 45 Courts extended the exemption to employees whose duties contributed in important ways to the spiritual mission of the church, despite lacking formal ordination, applying the primary duties test, on the basis of which “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order,
or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.” 46 This test raises the concern that it is not for the secular judges to decide what qualifies as a religious activity. A
church could “understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.” 47 The Hosanna-Tabor Court repeats the same legitimate concern refusing to engage in a substantive duties test, deferring to the judgment of
the church about who constitutes a “lay” or a “called” teacher. 48
This second exception is a limitation on the scope of application of Title VII, and
was carved by the courts “in order to reconcile the statute with the Constitution.” 49 The
application of Title VII to ministers would be seen, thus, as violating two constitutional
limitations on Congress: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The
former prevents the government from according preferential treatment for a specific religious community, and the latter consecrates the right to practice religion. According to
another opinion, “the ministers’ exception is a rule of interpretation, not a constitutional
rule; and though it is derived from policies that animate the First Amendment, the relevant policies come from the establishment clause rather than from the free-exercise

43. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (d):
(a) In general - It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that
an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability
has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this
subchapter. […] (d) Religious entities (1) In general - This subchapter shall not prohibit a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society
of its activities.
44. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (dismissing appellant’s Title VII suit alleging
sex discrimination in salary and benefits while appointed by the Salvation Army as one of its ordained ministers).
45. Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1182 (2007).
46. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).
47. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 336 (1987).
48. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
49. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Elvig v.
Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 800 (9th Cir. 2005) (dissent by Judge Kleinfeld, with whom
O’Scannlain, Callahan, and Bea, Circuit Judges, join); Wasserman, supra note 21.
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clause.” 50 This latter exception created by court interpretation was criticized as contrary
to the language of the statute, which prohibits expressis verbis discrimination on the basis of a number of grounds. 51 According to these criticisms, the exception amounts to
“state action,” allowing violation of the “constitutional rights of those excluded.” 52
The ministerial exception is a rule justified under the First Amendment, and the
separation of church and state protecting the autonomy of the churches from state intervention, a claim at the core of religious freedom. 53 Courts and scholars invoke as their
foundation the Free Exercise Clause as well as the Establishment Clause either interchangeably or in combination. 54 The judgment of whether a person is actually a minister
or not belongs to the religious organizations themselves, and the courts cannot substitute
their secular judgment without a serious threat to free exercise rights. 55 The ministerial
exception is also justified as a hybrid right, which combines the protection of multiple
clauses of the Bill of Rights. Prima facie a part of freedom of religion, freedom of association increases the weight of the protection, which must be accorded to the churches in
the choice of their employees. 56 The Supreme Court in the past has deferred to the judgment of the party concerned in expressive association cases. 57 The exception is justified
50. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008).
51. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 396 (1987); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: the
Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1079 (1996); see
also Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (“There is no indication in the legislative history that when Congress enacted the 1972 amendment it also intended to exempt sectarian schools
from liability for sex discrimination.”).
52. Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1079.
53. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1394 (1981) (expressing a rigid defense of
the right to church autonomy while accepting that the general right is not absolute. Laycock makes a claim that
“the state has no legitimate interest sufficient to warrant protection of church members from their church with
respect to discrimination, economic exploitation, or a wide range of other evils that the state tries to prevent in
the secular economy” unless there is explicit agreement which is made enforceable in a secular court.) Id. at
1403. Most churches would thus choose internal dispute resolution, as suing the church or a fellow member is
inconsistent with the norms of most religions. One can respond however that when churches behave as employers, given the considerable power that they exercise (see infra Part I.C.), especially in the case of disability
when this power is in reality the power of a majority which “incapacitates” a minority (see infra Part II.A.),
then there is a compelling interest in enforcing disability anti-discrimination laws, or at least recognizing
frontpay in case reinstatement seems impossible (see infra Part I.C.). Inconsistency with internal norms of religions for suing a church must be appreciated in a well-ordered society only in cases where no such compelling
interest is at stake as the social integration of the “disabled.” Otherwise, the very concept of the rule of law is in
danger (see infra Part I.B.).
54. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); Douglas Laycock, supra note 53, at
1373; Lupu, supra note 51, at 422; Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption From Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1982 (2007) [hereinafter Corbin,
Above the Law]; Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71 (2001).
55. See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1776-77 (2008); Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion
Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2011-12, 2032-34 (2007);
Lund, supra note 32, at 69-71.
56. See Mark Tushnet, supra note 54, at 91 for a discussion of hybrid rights.
57. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 653 (2000) (citing N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City
of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988), “[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the
group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”).
[I]introduction of government standards to the selection of spiritual leaders would signif-
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in order to avoid a clash of values between churches and government policies or “a differing emphasis among priorities or as to means in an employment decision of a theological nature.” 58 “[B]oth religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims
if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.” 59 More than other associations, ministers as “embodiments of [the] message” of the churches serve as their “voice
to the faithful,” making their selection “per se a religious exercise.” 60
The crucial question thus becomes how to define the scope of the exception in a
systematic interpretation of the relevant clause in reference to the net of disability regulations in a way as to be in conformity with the rule of law and the idea of living in a wellordered society. This exception must be interpreted as concerning the evaluation of the
substantive qualifications of the applicant as to whether she is the appropriate person to
teach the religious dogma of the religious institution employing her. If part of the mission of a religious school is to inculcate the religious doctrine and the normative system
that accompanies its system of beliefs, then it is appropriate to distinguish among candidates on the basis of who is the most appropriate person to inculcate these beliefs. A decision of appointing a minister on the basis of substantive competence cannot be evaluated by the courts, even if the institution discriminates on the basis of the above mentioned
criteria, as this is the core of the freedom protected by the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses. Anything that pertains to this decision is, by definition, beyond the
admissibility and the possibility of the courts to examine, as it would constitute an impermissible intrusion into matters of faith and doctrine. Perich was a substantively qualified minister and thus, the Lutheran Church’s ability to advocate its viewpoints was not
at stake in Hosanna-Tabor.
As the Hosanna-Tabor Court notes, the exception must concern questions of eligibility on the basis of the substance of the religious doctrine taught by the religious
school, such as the evaluation of the degree of religious training and the process of
commissioning 61—the evaluation of the teacher’s academic transcripts, letters of recommendation, personal statement and written answers to various ministry-related questions; and oral examination by a faculty committee at a Lutheran college—requirements
that took Perich six years to fulfill. 62 As Justices Alito and Kagan noted in their concurring opinion, if religious communities are autonomous under the First Amendment, this
means that their authorities “must be free to determine who is qualified to serve in position of substantial religious importance,” like those “who serve in positions of leader-

icantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and state. While an
unfettered church choice may create minimal infidelity to the objectives of Title VII, it
provides maximum protection of the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religious beliefs.
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, at 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).
58. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171.
59. Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
60. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The ministerial exception, as we
conceive of it, operates to bar any claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution’s right to
select who will perform particular spiritual functions.”).
61. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012).
62. Id.
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ship, those who perform important functions in worship services and in the performance
of religious ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.” 63 Thus, the ministerial exception
must concern “the freedom of religious groups to engage in certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical process of communicating the faith” and thus, the freedom of
the same groups “to choose the personnel who are essential to the performance of these
functions.” 64
Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church
administration and government, so are the functions which accompany
such a selection . . . these include the determination of a minister’s salary, her place of assignment, and the duty she is to perform in the furtherance of the religious mission of the church. 65
Courts of appeals have been interpreting this ministerial exception very broadly as
precluding application of legislation concerning the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministers. 66 The Hosanna-Tabor Court interprets the exception very widely, referring to the need to abstain from interfering with the “internal governance of the church” which would deprive “the church of control over the selection of

63. Id. at 712.
64. Id. at 711-12.
65. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff alleging race discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 in denial of promotion and
termination); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs expelled from the Salvation Army for filing lawsuit charging violation of the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007)
(plaintiff claiming that termination violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d
294 (3d Cir. 2006) (plaintiff alleging sex discrimination for being constructively discharged in a restructuring);
Werft v. Desert SW Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff
seeking damages for employment discrimination based on failure of church to accommodate his disabilities);
Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff minister terminated
for having civil commitment ceremony with her same sex partner); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in reassignment of her duties as
teacher of music and director of the church choir); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc.,
203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (appellant’s lawsuit alleging violation of Title VII for being reassigned for
helping a co-worker with a sexual harassment complaint dismissed); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference
of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (appeal of dismissal of Title VII sex and pregnancy
discrimination suit dismissed); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff alleging age
discrimination in termination violating Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 630 (1988), and Title VII , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (First Amendment trumps age anti-discrimination
provisions as “in determining whether the Church has discriminated on the basis of age a court would be required to consider the religious purpose of the antidiscrimination provision and to define its limits for the
Church”); Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989) (discharged plaintiff alleged violation of due process rights); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1165 (4th Cir. 1985) (lawsuit by woman denied pastoral position in Church charging it with sexual and racial
discrimination under Title VII barred by the religion clauses of the First Amendment).
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those who will personify its beliefs,” “imposing an unwanted minister.” 67 For the Supreme Court “[t]he Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.” 68 The Court further refers to precedents where it
refused in the past to intervene in matters of church government, and faith and doctrine. 69 For the Court “[t]he purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason;” 70 it is instead to ensure “that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter
‛strictly ecclesiastical,’ [. . .] —is the church’s alone.” 71 The justification imposed by the
First Amendment without consideration of the details of the specific case raises concerns, since what is at stake is not the substantive qualifications of Perich to be a minister. How far then can the exception to anti-discrimination law go? Is this broad interpretation justified? Exceptions to the principle against discrimination must be interpreted
narrowly. 72 An exemption concerning ministers should concern matters of faith, and not
the employment status of the ministers. Otherwise, the existence of labor law or antidiscrimination law does not make sense, as argued below. 73 In the past, the Supreme
Court has held that the BFOQ requirement exception imposed by Title VII must be interpreted very narrowly. 74
The Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church classifies its schoolteachers into
two categories: “called” and “lay.” 75 The first are regarded as having been called to their
vocation by God and are required to complete some academic requirements, including a
course of theological study. 76 The latter are not required to be trained by the Synod or to

67. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012).
68. Id. at 703.
69. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696, 720 (1976) (civil
action by bishop for being removed from office for defiance of the church hierarchy concerns “quintessentially
religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical
tribunals.”); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)
(noting that the Watson opinion “radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence
from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727
(1871) (holding that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law
have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”).
70. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709.
71. Id. (citing Kedroff, 344 U. S. 94 at 119).
72. Cf. Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious Discrimination and the Religious Exemption Question, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2069, 2076 (2011).
73. See infra Part I.B.
74. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
We are persuaded—by the restrictive language of § 703 (e), the relevant legislative history, and the consistent interpretation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—that the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to
the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id. at 334. The EEOC issued guidelines on sex discrimination in 1965 reflecting its position that “the bona fide
occupational qualification as to sex should be interpreted narrowly.” 29 CFR § 1604.2(a).
75. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699.
76. Id. at 699.
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be Lutheran, and are hired when called teachers are unavailable. 77 Cheryl Perich became
a called teacher and in addition to teaching secular subjects, taught a religion class, led
her students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, and took her students to a weekly
school-wide chapel service. She also led the service about twice a year. 78 Contrary to the
Court of Appeals’ holding, 79 who qualifies as a minister is a judgment that must be left
to the autonomy of the churches. In this specific case, “Perich’s job duties reflected a
role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission,” 80 since “significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of . . .
[her] position.” 81 The question thus emerges whether persons who do qualify as ministers according to the criteria of the church are exempt from the protection of the ADA for
a disability that they develop at a time posterior to their appointment. Allowing the
churches to define on the basis of their own uncontrollable criteria the substantive qualifications of the legal category “minister” does not mean that this category should be exempt from the protection of the ADA.
According to the concurring opinion of Justices Alito and Kagan concerning ministers, “[i]f a religious group believes that the ability of such an employee to perform
these key functions has been compromised, then the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom protects the group’s right to remove the employee from his or her position.” 82
The proper balance between freedom of religion and anti-discrimination law imposes a
consideration of the reasons of the termination. If the church puts forward inability to
fulfill the duties on the basis of a doctrinal disagreement or question, which is beyond the
ability of the courts to control on the basis of the First Amendment, then the church has
the right to terminate the employment. If, however, termination is due to a disability
which emerged after the appointment of the minister, and which does not relate to the
substantive ability of the minister to accomplish her teaching duties as defined by the
church, then the clauses of anti-discrimination law should apply, protecting all ministers
from the danger of losing their work on the basis of an accident that might occur, at some
point in their life, leaving them disabled while they are appropriately accomplishing their
duties to their employer. This is a claim upon which there can be an overlapping consensus independent from a person’s religious or more generally comprehensive views. 83
By focusing on the autonomy of the churches in view of ruling inapplicable an entire category of law, that is anti-discrimination law, the Court undermines the very concept of the rule of law and the idea of living in a well-ordered society. 84 Enforcing the
respect of disability anti-discrimination law does not mean imposing an unwanted minister. The courts do not interfere in a religious debate proposing a specific interpretation,
which would impose a minister that the church does not accept, violating the First
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 700.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d 769, 780-81 (2010).
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 712. (Alito and Kagan, JJ., concurring).
See infra part II.B.
See infra part I.B.
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Amendment rights of the specific church. Hosanna-Tabor concerns a minister that already satisfied these internal uncontrollable criteria of religious doctrine, a person already appointed as a “called” teacher who invoked the exercise of a right that does not
pertain to the religious doctrine at all. By enforcing anti-discrimination law, courts are
enforcing a law of general applicability aimed at protecting the disabled, which is totally
irrelevant to the internal doctrinal point of view of the specific church-employer. It is
hard to see how Hosanna-Tabor “concerns government interference with an internal
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself,” 85 since there is no
doctrinal matter at stake. The church did not put forward a doctrinal reason against maintaining disabled employees. The ministerial exemptions should concern matters of religious doctrine, and courts are able to make a distinction between what pertains to religious doctrine and what does not in this case. Disability discrimination in particular is a
kind of discrimination which can be easily distinguished from other criteria that pertain
to the doctrine of a religious community. It is highly unlikely that the discrimination on
the grounds of disability will ever appear as supported by the internal dogma of a religious institution. 86 This is all the more obvious in cases of termination of a substantively
qualified minister like Perich. The church of Hosanna-Tabor had accepted the application of anti-discrimination law in regulating its relations with its employees as is obvious
from the school handbook. 87 The case, as it stands, allows for the possibility of terminating a minister who following, for example, a car accident is obliged to use a wheelchair
in order to move. This result is what anti-discrimination legislation aims to prevent.
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion expressed the idea that the extensive interpretation of the ministerial exception is imposed by the concern that since there is disagreement on who qualifies as a minister, judicial attempts to define this issue risk “disadvantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and membership are outside
of the ‘mainstream’ or unpalatable to some.” 88 “[T]he question whether an employee is
a minister is itself religious in nature, and the answer will vary widely.” 89 Courts, however, can easily distinguish once the churches are allowed to define who qualifies as a
“minister” whether a dispute involves a matter of internal religious doctrine beyond their
control on the basis of the First Amendment, and whether it involves a matter of disability anti-discrimination law. The distinction between what is an issue internal to religious
doctrine and what is a violation of disability laws is easy to make. Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the ADA to broadly protect employees from the arbitrariness of religious employers from retaliation on the grounds of exercising their rights
providing the following example:
[A]ssume that a Mormon organization wishes to hire only Mormons to
perform certain jobs. If a person with a disability applies for the job,

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
Cf. Lund, supra note 32, at 32.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d 769, 782 (2010).
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 710.
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but is not a Mormon, the organization can refuse to hire him or her.
However, if two Mormons apply for a job, one with a disability and one
without a disability, the organization cannot discriminate against the
applicant with the disability because of that person’s disability. 90
Thus, the philosophy crystallized in the law is that a religious organization may not
discriminate between individuals who equally satisfy the permitted religious criteria on
the basis of disability. Cases where the disability prevents the minister from exercising
her expected duties should also be considered in reference to the evaluation of the ability
to do the job, and the possibility of the religious institution to offer a “reasonable accommodation” without undue hardship. 91 This is an aspect of the employment relation,
which can be evaluated without reference to the religious dogma of the institution and
the substantive capacity of the minister. 92
The criteria of appointing a person as a minister pertain to religious doctrine in reference to the ministerial exception. If a religious institution asserts that gender discrimination is imposed on the basis of its religious doctrine, then it should be accepted. 93 It is
very unlikely that such a justification will emerge for disability. However, once a person
is appointed according to religious criteria, she must enjoy the protection of labor and
anti-discrimination laws. Cases of discharging are thus less threatening to religion, since
the religious institution has already “determined that the individuals initially met their
religious qualifications.” 94 The requirement of protecting freedom of religion is met in
these cases. Examination of whether the discharge is due to illegal discrimination is easier and the state can legitimately serve the interest in preventing discrimination with a
minimal impact on religious beliefs. Courts will not be asked to decide who qualifies according to the doctrinal criteria. They will just need to determine whether there is a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, and whether this reason is a pretext or not.
When the religious institution does not assert that the alleged discrimination is actually
dictated by the religious dogma, as in gender discrimination, 95 courts exercise a review
90. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 485 part 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1990)).
91. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.
92. Contra Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1021 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (declining
to inquire whether plaintiff was using reasonable accommodation provided by religious institutions as “the
analysis quickly implicates whether the performance she was providing could meet her religious obligations.”).
The court refused to examine whether plaintiff was actually using reasonable accommodation offered by her
employer, a question of fact, which does not imply evaluation of religious doctrine.
93. Cf. Griffin, Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 22, at 44-48.
94. Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1107.
95. In Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), the court
found that gender discrimination was imposed by theological reasons. In “quintessentially religious” matters,
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720. “[T]he free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects the act of a decision
rather than a motivation behind it. In these sensitive areas, the state may no more require a minimum basis in
doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal content.” Id. at 1169. “But courts must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a compelling state interest from burdens where the ‘inroad on
religious liberty’ is too substantial to be permissible.” Id.
Of course, churches are not—and should not be—above the law. Like any other person or
organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts. Their
employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not
involve the church’s spiritual functions.
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“much less threatening to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment than the pervasive reach of the [] NLRB which concerned the Supreme Court in [NLRB v.] Catholic
Bishop [of Chicago].” 96 When no religious reason exists, the state interest to oppose discrimination should outweigh the vague reference to religious freedom. This means that a
woman already appointed as a minister can raise a claim of discrimination in her pay
since her ability to be appointed as a minister is not at stake. 97 It is a resolved issue. If
churches, though, accept women as ministers, then salary inequality between men and
women for providing the same kind of services cannot be justified. However, cases
where pastors are terminated for behavior which indicates departure from church doctrine imply evaluation of qualifications and standard of performance within the role of
being a minister, which does not belong to the state’s adjudicative competence. 98
Once a minister thus selected and fulfilling all the substantive criteria that the
church imposes and which are uncontrollable by the courts on the basis of religious freedom develops a disability, should she be deprived from the protection of disability antidiscrimination law? This is the point where the autonomy of the church stops and the application of anti-discrimination law begins. This is the reason of existence of disability
anti-discrimination law—protecting individuals from the arbitrary policies of their employers when they are based on their disability. Many of these cases do not involve any
entanglement at all, as it is possible to distinguish between a doctrinal matter covered by
freedom of religion and a nondoctrinal matter which is not. 99 Courts can and must decide
on a case-by-case basis whether there is unlawful discrimination or whether the First
Amendment bars a similar claim. 100
Courts make such distinctions between expert knowledge, which they cannot evaluate, and facts that they can evaluate very frequently. In the United States in the academic context, courts have shown that they can distinguish between substantive issues pertaining to the qualifications of an employee, which are thus uncontrollable as the courts
lack the necessary knowledge to evaluate them, and legal issues, which can be controlled. As a matter of substance, academic institutions, just like religious ones, are the
most appropriate on the basis of their First Amendment freedoms to decide who will

Id. at 1171.
96. Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Torgerson
v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (concerning an administrative employee of a Jewish Temple and referring to NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)).
97. See infra Part I.C.
98. Singleton v. Christ the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church, 541 N.W.2d 606, 611, 612 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (concerning theological conflicts between the pastor and the church and its members); Music v.
United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 287, 290 (Ky. 1993) (concerning internal church discipline, faith,
and organization, governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law).
99. Cf. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[T]he ADEA, unlike the NRLA, does not pose the risk of “extensive or continuous administrative or judicial intrusion into the functions of religious institutions.” [citation
omitted] Instead, the ADEA involves “routine regulatory interaction” and requires “no
inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no
detailed monitoring [or] close administrative contact between secular and religious bodies.”
Id. (citing Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989)).
100. Cf. Weissman, 38 F.3d at 1044.
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serve as their employees. Although courts abstain from evaluating the substantive qualifications of a candidate deferring to the employer’s scientific judgment, they can evaluate whether a selection policy shows intentional bias or “no rational basis,” 101 or “if the
criteria used and the procedures followed were reasonable and rationally related to the
decision reached.” 102 Courts are thus in position to distinguish between a substantive
qualification, academic or religious-doctrinal, which is uncontrollable and rightly so, and
a legal claim violating anti-discrimination requirements.
This doctrine of judicial appreciation of the extreme limits of the discretion recognized to competent bodies for expert judgments on religious, scientific, and other bases,
which are beyond the competence of the civil courts, especially when civil rights are at
stake and not an incontrollable expert judgment, is common in European courts. French
courts in public law litigations abstain from evaluating the discretionary power of the
administration to evaluate the substantive qualifications of a candidate for a position,
limiting their control to what constitutes “an obvious mistake of appreciation.” 103 The
French labor code prohibits terminations discriminating on the basis of disability, 104 and
besides civil sanctions, employers incur criminal sanctions in cases of illegal discrimination. 105 Religious institutions are not exempt from labor regulations, 106 although they are
recognized as enterprises de tendance, enterprises with a special purpose. 107 Once hiring
has taken place on the basis of substantive religious uncontrollable criteria, this does not
mean that the institution is allowed to discriminate towards its employees. 108 Employers
are not allowed to terminate employees in a discriminatory way, and an employee in a
private educational institution can sue for discrimination in the development of her career even if a religious institution is the employer. 109 The firing of a homosexual sacristan from a catholic parish was considered by the French Court of Cassation (supreme jurisdiction of the judiciary branch) as violating labor laws. 110 The court noted that the
court of appeals which upheld the firing had violated labor laws since the firing concerned the “mores” of the employee, whereas his actions had not caused any problem
within the association (“trouble caracterisé”).
In a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights, issued after Hosanna-Tabor, the court referred to the “autonomy of religious communities” concerning
“their own opinion on any collective activities of their members that might undermine

101. EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D. Mass. 1975). See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 961 (1982).
102. Johnson v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1357 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
103. This is the doctrine of the “L’erreur manifeste d’appréciation.” See 1 ANDRE DE LAUBADERE, JEANCLAUDE VENEZIA & YVES GAUDEMET, TRAITE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 590-91 (1999).
104. Code du Travail Article L. 1132-1; see generally JEAN PELISSIER, GILLES AUZERO & EMMANUEL
DOCKES, DROIT DU TRAVAIL, 549-53 (2011).
105. Code Pénal, art. 225-1.
106. Cour de Cass. Crim. Jan 14. 2003 Application No. 01-87300.
107. See generally François Gaudu, Labor Law and Religion, 30 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y J. 507, 515
(2009).
108. Id. at 515.
109. Deliberations of HALDE No. 2007-170 (July 2, 2007).
110. Cour de Cass. Soc. Apr. 17, 1991, Application No. 90-42636.
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their autonomy.” 111 The court deferred to the “margin of appreciation” of the state to decide “whether or not to recognise trade unions that operate within religious communities
and pursue aims that might hinder the exercise of such communities’ autonomy,” given
that there is a “lack of a European consensus on this matter.” 112 As the dissenting judges
noted, however, the measure was not proportionate or necessary for “preserving the autonomy of the Romanian Orthodox Church.” 113 Both the dissenting judges and the majority mention that the European States do not exclude members of the clergy from the
right to form trade unions and in some countries “they are even expressly afforded that
right.” 114 Similarly, the case does not exclude that ministers have a right to access courts,
which will decide as a last resort what rights they have against their employer, the religious institution.

B.

Is the Ministerial Exception compatible with Smith?

The refusal to enforce Perich’s rights protected by the ADA raises concerns of
compatibility with Smith. 115 In Smith, the respondent was asking for a religious exemption from a law criminalizing consumption of peyote. 116 Smith was fired from his job
with a private drug rehabilitation organization for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, and was denied unemployment
compensation as he was determined to be ineligible for benefits for having been discharged for work-related “misconduct.” 117 The Supreme Court held that “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” 118 The Court cited a number of
precedents where it reached the same ruling:
“Laws,” we said, “are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may

111. Sindicatul “Pastorul Cel Bun” v. Romania, July 9, 2013, Application no. 2330/09, § 159.
112. Id. at § 171.
113. Id. at § 5 (Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Speilmann, Villiger, Lopez Guerra, Bianku, Mose
and Jäderblom).
114. Id. at § 61 (majority opinion). “In Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands there are trade unions for ministers of religion, or associations that defend interests
closely resembling those defended by workers’ trade unions.” Id.
115. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Cf. Jack M. Battaglia, Religion,
Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 379-81 (1999); Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 275 (1994); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 54, at 1983; Griffin, Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 22; Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 130-31 (2009); Tushnet, supra note 54, at 84; Martin, supra note 34, at
1301; Peter Danchin, Hosanna-Tabor in the religious freedom Panopticon, THE IMMANENT FRAME (Mar. 6,
2012, 1:49 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/ tif/2012/03/06/hosanna-tabor-in-the-religious-freedom-panopticon/.
116. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 at 878-79.
117. Id. at 874.
118. Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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with practices. . . . Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” 119
A “private right to ignore generally applicable laws” is for the Court “a constitutional anomaly.” 120 Smith was thus denied unemployment benefits. The Court held that
“[g]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” 121
The Hosanna-Tabor Court dismissed the application of Smith, which would preclude recognition of a ministerial exception, holding that it “involved government regulation of only outward physical acts,” whereas “[t]he present case . . . concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of
the church itself.” 122 A counterargument to this point would be that disability antidiscrimination law does not concern in any case the “faith” or the “mission” of the
church itself. It is in reality an aspect totally external to its internal dogma. 123 The justification offered for Perich’s dismissal does not concern her inability to fulfill the religious
aspect of her duties, nor her fitness for offering the religious instruction she had been offering to the school five years before her disability appeared. What is at stake is whether
a totally fit and appropriate religious instructor has the benefits of disability anti-

119. Id. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)) (rejecting the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice); see also id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982)) (holding that an Amish employer
cannot be exempted from collection and payment of Social Security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith
prohibited participation in governmental support programs); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)
(sustaining the military Selective Service System against the claim that it violated free exercise by conscripting
persons who opposed a particular war on religious grounds); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding Sunday closing laws against the claim that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose religions compelled them to refrain from work on other days); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (holding that a mother could be prosecuted under the child labor laws for using her children to dispense literature in the streets, her religious motivation notwithstanding); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940).
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion
or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see Smith, 494 U.S. at 880, citing Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make religious activities more difficult).
120. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
121. Id.
122. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
123. Ian Bartrum argues that the constitutional values of representation and identity suggest that decisions
that threaten the basic equality and inclusiveness central to U.S. polity must be treated as “outward” actions
that fall within the state’s supervisory jurisdiction. The author accepts a principle of toleration of church governance decisions made on the basis of gender, sexual orientation and disability excluding race, as racial
equality occupies a special place in U.S. constitutional hierarchy. See Ian C. Bartrum, The Ministerial Exception and the Limits of Religious Sovereignty, WHERE LAW AND RELIGION MEET - THE ONLINE JOURNAL OF
THE EMORY CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LAW AND RELIGION (July 19, 2012), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117335. This approach does not consider Smith, which has constitutionalized the requirement of compliance with a neutral law of general applicability, like the ADA.
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discrimination law for an impediment, which emerged at a moment posterior to the substantive judgment of whether she qualified as a minister. When the substantive competence of the religious minister is not at stake, enforcing anti-discrimination law is a universal and thus compelling interest, as the analysis of Part II of this article shows. 124
Smith has constitutionalized the requirement of a generally applicable neutral law in
view of limiting religious freedom, even in the absence of a compelling governmental
interest. In Perich’s case, her rights are not only consecrated by a neutral law of general
applicability, the ADA, meeting thus the constitutional requirement imposed by Smith,
but the law actually serves a compelling interest as well, making the need of enforcing it
all the more imperative.
Late in the Hosanna-Tabor litigation, the Lutheran Church attempted to present the
totally legitimate question of exercising a legally protected right, suing in order to have
one’s rights enforced, as a doctrinal matter, as an act, which contravenes the Lutheran
dogma. 125 According to Justice Alito’s and Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion, Perich
was discharged because she threatened to file suit against the church in a civil court, a
threat which “contravened the Lutheran doctrine that disputes among Christians should
be resolved internally without resort to the civil court system.” 126 According to the two
Justices, for civil courts to prove the real reason for respondent’s firing they “would be
required to make a judgment about church doctrine.” 127 This is indeed a delicate issue at
the margins between the rule of law and the autonomy of the religious institution. However, in these cases of limits between religious doctrine and anti-discrimination law, it is
anti-discrimination law that must be enforced in order to protect against the arbitrariness
of the employer who discriminates on the grounds of disability. Perich was discharged
because she informed her employer that she would sue the church, making use of a right
imputed to her by disability anti-discrimination laws. When such a right exists, the courts
should enforce it. The fact-finding process does not need to go so deeply into evaluating
the importance of alternative dispute resolution for the specific dogma of a religious
community as the two concurring Justices asserted. 128 If a religious doctrine of a church
prevents one of its employees from exercising a right recognized by the law, it is the law
that must be enforced. 129 In order to establish a case under the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove that she is a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of the job
as they are defined by the religious incontrollable criteria that the church imposes exer-

124. See infra Part II.B.
125. Griffin, Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 22.
126. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 715 (2012) (Alito and
Kagan, JJ., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in the same case, contrary to Hosanna-Tabor’s assertions, Perich’s claim would not require the court to analyze any church doctrine; rather, a trial would focus on
issues such as whether Perich was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, whether Perich opposed a practice
that was unlawful under the ADA, and whether Hosanna-Tabor violated the ADA in its treatment of Perich.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d 769, 781-82 (6th Cir. 2010) rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. 2012). A causal
link between the activity protected by the ADA and the adverse action of the church must be proved as well;
see Corbin, Irony of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 29, at 102.
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cising its First Amendment rights. 130 The ADA thus applies once the solid doctrinal decision has been made.
Rules must be based on a public justification and “[t]hey must be treated as entrenched with respect to their own generating justifications. . . [as well as] with respect to
other rules.” 131 Freedom of religion should be interpreted in harmony with a neutral law
of general applicability protecting against discrimination on the grounds of disability.
Having access to civil courts in order to have these rights enforced, when a religious institution negates them, is an essential aspect of the protection of these rights. If a religious doctrine negates this possibility, then the freedom of religion of this institution
should cede before the requirements of protecting others’ rights. This is constitutive of a
well-ordered and cooperative society. 132 Freedom of religion should not serve as a defense in order for churches to negate the legally recognized rights of their employees on
the basis of disability anti-discrimination law.
The solution imposed by a systematic interpretation of all of the clauses of the Bill
of Rights, which treats the Constitution as expressing a consistent whole of values, is that
the First Amendment must be interpreted in harmony with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 133 ideas of equality. 134 Following the reconstruction, 135 the Fourteenth Amendment inserted on the level of the Constitution the “equal protection of the laws.” The
right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of disability and the right to have access to the courts in order to have the first right enforced are such rights which realize the
constitutional requirement of assuring “equal protection of the laws” to everyone. The
Fifteenth Amendment, 136 granting voting rights to African-Americans, and the Nineteenth Amendment, 137 granting the same rights to women consolidated this vision. The
principle of freedom of religion has an equal constitutional value with the principle of
equal liberty and free development for all, and it must be interpreted as having such an
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2009). “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” (emphasis
added).
131. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 190-91 (Tony Honore and Joseph Raz eds., 1991).
132. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
133. U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
134. Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1067.
135. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. II: TRANSFORMATIONS 110-11 (1998). AKHILL R. AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION (1998). Bruce Ackerman parallels the shift in constitutional values to a constitutional revolution.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1-2. “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Id.
at § 1; “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Id. at § 2.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1-2. “The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”. Id. at § 1; “Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Id. at § 2.
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equal value. In cases of conflict between the two rights, courts should be committed to
finding a solution, which assures the proper harmonization for the exercise of both rights
to the extent that it is possible; and in this case it is. 138 Accepting a solution, which allows discrimination on behalf of religious institutions on the basis of disability is of
doubtful compatibility with existing constitutional law. It also neglects the compelling
interests that the ADA serves, reinforcing the denial of political access to an entire category of citizens who are different and whose differences are being misunderstood and
misinterpreted as impossibilities. 139
Access to courts is, according to the Supreme Court, a “fundamental constitutional
right,” 140 an essential aspect of due process protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. 141 If settling disputes against the state justifies having access to courts, excluding the same right for disputes among private persons in labor proceedings, especially when a legally protected right is at stake, at least a very strong justification is needed.
Perich was exercising a right recognized by a law of general applicability, the ADA,
which on the basis of Smith can suffice as a constitutional requirement in order to limit
another constitutionally protected liberty, like freedom of religion. 142 In addition, the
same right is a constitutionally protected right as a direct realization of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s requirement of assuring to everyone the “equal protection of the laws.”
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of access to courts in civil proceedings concerning divorce, holding that filing fees are equivalent “absent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance” to a “denial of due process.” 143 The Court held
that “with the ability to seek regularized resolution of conflicts, individuals are capable
of interdependent action that enables them to strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized society.” 144
Depriving an employee of the possibility of exercising her legal rights, in this case
the right not to be discriminated on the basis of disability and the right to have access to
courts in order to have the first right enforced, in reference to a religious dogma is an
138. See infra Part I.C.
139. See infra Part II.A.
140. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). For an analysis, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1133-51 (2009).
141. U.S. CONST. amend V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
142. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
143. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-81 (1971).
144. Id. at 374.
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than
its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of
its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitely settle their differences in
an orderly, predictable manner . . . . Without such a “legal system,” social organization
and cohesion are virtually impossible . . . it is this injection of the rule of law that allows
society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the “state of nature.”
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overreaching of the religious dogma to an area that is regulated by state law. The autonomy of the churches ends where the ADA rights begin. The need to protect a person’s
legally recognized rights, is a rule on which there can be an overlapping consensus on
the philosophical level. 145 A justification of a rule like this one that permeates the system
of the law, 146 points towards an interpretation of existing legal rules that allow for a practical harmonization of the protection of the rights of all parties involved in the case. 147
Enforcing disability anti-discrimination law is also a right with a very strong philosophical justification in reference to the idea of a well-ordered liberal political society: it
is a universalizable claim upon which there can be an overlapping consensus independently from the religious views that a person holds. 148 A person should not lose her
job for exercising a legally recognized right; otherwise the existence of a legal system
itself does not make sense. The exercise of a person’s legally protected rights should not
be prevented in reference to a contrary religious dogma. The religious dogma must cede
before the application of the law; in this case, as it exceeds the limits recognized to it by
the legal system since the opposite would be contrary to the idea of living in a wellordered society. Otherwise, religion would be overstepping the boundaries, which allow
peaceful coexistence inside a well-regulated society. People should be able to affirm
their comprehensive doctrines such as religious doctrines while at the same time keeping
them separate from the public political sphere. As Rawls notes, 149 there has to be and
there is a common ground, which reasonable comprehensive doctrines can agree to protect, even if these doctrines are in conflict, that specify the fundamental terms of political
and social cooperation; otherwise social coexistence would be impossible. 150 The legally
recognized rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of disability are rights of
this kind. On the basis of a Rawlsian reasoning, the test in each case should be whether
there can be an overlapping consensus that certain legal rights should be enforced. 151 In
Kantian terms, these are rights, which are universalizable, or in Habermassian terms,
rights, which all persons concerned would accept in an ideal speech situation where only
the force of the best argument is accepted, that they must be enforced. 152
All citizens, employees of religious institutions included, should have the rights
recognized by disability anti-discrimination law enforced independently from their
membership to a specific religious community. Accepting the jurisdiction of the civil
courts in view of enforcing these legally protected rights is a right that can also assemble
an overlapping consensus marking the boundaries of what is acceptable or not in a wellordered society that respects all its citizens and is committed to providing them equal
opportunities. Just like the religious institutions can sue the state if it is overstepping its
145. See infra Part II.B.
146. See SCHAUER, supra note 131, at 190.
147. Cf. Minow, supra note 35, at 847.
148. See infra Part I.B and II.B.
149. See infra notes 310-23 and accompanying text.
150. See Bartrum, supra note 123. Bartrum makes an argument very close to this one referring to Locke’s
conception of cohesion in a political community in JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, chs. 810 (1690).
151. See infra Part II.B.
152. Id.
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boundaries violating their religious freedom on the basis of the First Amendment, the
employees of a religious institution should be able to sue the institution if it is overstepping its boundaries refusing to comply with disability anti-discrimination law. As Habermas notes, 153 the state should be able to constrain actors of civil society if they violate
others’ legally protected rights to liberty and free development. The civil jurisdiction of
the courts is the medium, which will assure recognition that those who were excluded by
the violence of words of a powerful majority and relegated to the category of “disabled,”
will be able to live a meaningful life, as argued below. 154 The law has a profoundly liberating potential for the weakest participants in social interaction, as it can recognize and
enforce rights, which otherwise would not be protected due to the power inequalities that
inevitably exist in the dynamics of every society. Access to courts, in order to have these
rights enforced, is an indispensable element of their recognition and is also consecrated
by laws that are neutral and of general applicability.
This interpretation fits well with numerous past Supreme Court cases. The Smith
Court did not accept the use of peyote, although the ritual of the dogma of the specific
religious community imposed it, and the Reynolds v. United States Court did not accept
the right to polygamy, although the concerned religious community presented a First
Amendment claim. 155 Courts always appreciate the limits of one freedom to the detriment of another striking a balance, and in Hosanna-Tabor they have erred on the side of
freedom of religion. Anti-discrimination law is not a facially neutral law targeting a specific religion either, which would be unconstitutional under Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. 156 It is not a neutral law of general applicability enacted with
the aim to prohibit a specific religious practice. It was enacted in order to protect the
rights of the weaker part—the disabled against the abuses of their employers. Allowing
religious exemptions from compliance with a law of general applicability, in this case,
means disadvantaging those who do not subscribe to these beliefs, as well as discriminating between secular and non-secular beliefs 157 of employers and employees raising concerns of compatibility with the Establishment Clause. 158 Wide judicial deference to religious institutions for the enforcement of disability anti-discrimination law should not be
accepted.

C. A different treatment for religious institutions compared to individuals?
A number of court cases have attempted to distinguish between the free exercise

153. See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Part II.A.
155. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879).
156. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (invalidating a law
prima facie of general applicability, enacted however in order to limit the sacrificial practices of a specific religion).
157. Cf. PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT
22 (1961).
158. See infra Part I.C.
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rights of individuals from those of the churches in the application of Smith. 159 Their key
argument consists in putting forward that “the burden on free exercise that is addressed
by the ministerial exception is of a fundamentally different character from that at issue in
Smith,” which is “designed to protect the freedom of the church to select those who will
carry out its religious mission.” 160 The distinction is not very persuasive, unless a doctrinal issue is at stake. It holds concerning the refusal to tenure a minister in reference to
her academic and doctrinal credentials, 161 which is beyond the competence of the courts
to evaluate. In this case, civil judges cannot substitute their judgment to the expert judgment of the academic committee of a religious university assessing the scholarship of a
faculty member in view of granting her tenure. However, it cannot justify the termination
of a minister entitled to maternity leave, whose childbirth caused complications extending her inability to provide her services to the church and who raised an issue of gender
discrimination in her pay, 162 in the absence of any other substantive reason pertaining to
her competence to be a minister. If women are accepted as substantively qualified ministers, then discrimination in their pay compared to male ministers does not make sense. In
cases where another right seems to be at stake, granted by a law of general applicability,
a civil right whose courts can assess the violation on the basis of criteria irrelevant to the
religious doctrine, then a more detailed examination has to take place in view of assuring
that the right is protected. In this case concerning the female minister, the court held that
“in investigating employment discrimination claims by ministers against their church,
secular authorities would necessarily intrude into church governance in a manner that
would be inherently coercive, even if the alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal.” 163 However, it is to be noted that in a well-ordered society the doctrinal autonomy of the churches does not mean license to harm others’ legally protected rights.
Coercing the churches so that they do not violate others’ rights is the kind of legal coercion widely accepted in a liberal society: the very purpose of a legal system is to assure
an equilibrated exercise of the rights of all social members to the extent that this is possible and just. By accepting the criterion of the doctrinal or non-doctrinal issue at stake, the
autonomy of the churches to manage their own affairs is protected while acts harmful to
others are limited. While judicial deference is imposed by the need to protect the autonomy of the religious institutions, courts possess the necessary expertise in “evaluating
circumstantial evidence to ferret out discrimination.” 164 If circumstantial evidence is
missing, courts can always defer to the evaluation of the religious institutions. 165
159. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (1996); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348 (1999).
160. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462.
161. As in the case of Catholic Univ., where plaintiff “would be a member of an ecclesiastical faculty whose
stated mission is to ‘foster and teach sacred doctrine and the disciplines related to it.’” Canonical Statutes of the
Ecclesiastical Faculties of the Catholic University of America (“Canonical Statutes”), Part I, Sec. 2. Id. at 46364.
162. See Combs, 173 F.3d at 343.
163. Id. at 350 (citing Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974)) (emphasis added). The
later case, though, concerned a minister whose sermons were substantively displeasing to certain members of
the congregation and thus in substance incontrollable by courts; Simpson, 494 F.2d at 492.
164. See also Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 54.
165. Id.
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Is the ministerial exception a “hybrid” situation necessitating increased protection
as it combines free exercise claims with Establishment Clause and expressive association
safeguards? 166 Smith eliminated strict scrutiny in cases involving the application of neutral generally applicable laws, maintaining it however, in cases combining free exercise
claims with other constitutional protections. 167 However, freedom of association for religious institutions must be evaluated in this context in reference to the fact that they are
operating as employers and must thus respect labor laws. Courts have accepted in the
past that “the First Amendment does not exempt religious institutions from all statutes
that regulate employment . . . [f]or example . . . from laws that regulate the minimum
wage or the use of child labor even though both involve employment relationships.” 168
Similarly, courts have been willing to enforce Title VII in harassment cases concerning
ministers. 169 If “sexual harassment is not protected by the First Amendment,” 170 disability discrimination should not be protected either. The protection of the ADA is a form of
labor law, which should have been applied in this case as well. Even Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Dale recognized that freedom of association is not absolute and can be limited by a
law furthering a compelling state interest. 171 Dale, which held that promoting antidiscrimination on the basis of sexual preferences is not a compelling interest, concerned
a volunteer and not an employee. 172 When religious institutions operate as employers, the
interest to promote anti-discrimination in the labor market becomes all the more compelling. 173 Anti-discrimination law is such a law furthering the compelling interest of eliminating discrimination for the disabled. 174
In a number of cases, courts held that freedom of association does not trump employment opportunities. In Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, the Court
held that the minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act applied to workers engaged in the commercial activities of nonprofit reli166. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
167. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
168. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Emp’t Div., 494 U.S.
872, at 888; Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 291 (1985) (minimum wage);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944) (child labor)).
169. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999); Elvig, 397 F.3d at
791; Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“The establishment clause is not an automatic barrier to governmental regulation.”). See Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 291 (1985) (applying FLSA to a
religious foundation); Salvation Army v. N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying
state building regulations to religious organization). Excessive entanglement is, ultimately, a question of degree. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Permitting Black’s claim to go
forward presents no greater conflict with the church’s disciplinary authority than that presented in cases enforcing child abuse laws. See, e.g., State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353 (1990) (conviction of religious counselors for failure to comply with child abuse reporting statute did not violate Establishment Clause). “We hold,
therefore, that the first amendment does not bar Black from litigating her sexual harassment claim.”). Black,
471 N.W.2d at 721; see also Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1009 (D. Kan. 2004) (“To
the extent plaintiff can demonstrate that defendant engaged in retaliatory harassment that did not involve an
employment decision relating to its choice of a minister, and so long as defendant does not assert a religious
justification for the alleged harassment the First Amendment does not preclude her claims.”).
170. Elvig, 397 F.3d, at 795.
171. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
172. Id. at 640.
173. Cf. Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 54, at 2035.
174. See infra Part II.
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gious organizations. 175 Application of the Act to the Foundation did not infringe on
rights protected by the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 176 Expressive association defenses have been rejected by the Supreme Court in the past for sex discrimination
in membership in private associations, 177 holding that anti-discrimination laws “plainly
serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order” 178 for assuring access to quasicommercial conduct involving “goods, privileges and advantages,” 179 as well as concerning partnership in law firm. 180 The protection of freedom of religion as an expressive association claim makes sense in reference to the vertical relation concerning the rights of
a religious association against the power of the state, but not in the context where the
government intervenes in civil society in order to protect the weaker part among two private actors, in the horizontal relation between the employee of the religious institution
against the aggregate of power of the religious institution. 181 Thus in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 182 the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
should be construed so as not to grant the NLRB jurisdiction over labor relations between parochial schools and their teachers on the basis of the First Amendment, but must
also be interpreted as covering all the uncontrollable elements of substantive judgment of
the institutions concerned. The Supreme Court has noted that “even religious schools
cannot claim to be wholly free from some state regulation.” 183 Thus, the Ohio Civil
175. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 291 (1985).
176. According to the court, there is “no ‘significant risk’ of an infringement on First Amendment rights.”
Id. at 298. Although the religious institution argued that the businesses functioned as “churches in disguise”
and “vehicles for preaching and teaching the gospel to the public,” the lower courts found that:
[T]he Foundation’s businesses serve the general public in competition with ordinary
commercial enterprises and the payment of substandard wages would undoubtedly give
petitioners and similar organizations an advantage over their competitors. It is exactly
this kind of “unfair method of competition” that the Act was intended to prevent. See 29
U.S.C. § 202(a)(3) and the admixture of religious motivations does not alter a business’
effect on commerce.
Id. at 298-99.
177. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) (application of sex
anti-discrimination law in membership in private association does not violate the First Amendment rights of the
association). “In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship.” Id. at 546 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)
(holding that the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibiting discrimination in membership limits freedom of
expressive association)).
178. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624.
179. Id. at 626. Thus, in explaining its conclusion that the Jaycees local chapters are “[places] of public accommodations” within the meaning of the Act, the Minnesota court noted the various commercial programs
and benefits offered to members, and stated that “leadership skills are ‘goods,’ [and] business contacts and employment promotions are ‘privileges’ and ‘advantages’. . . .” U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 764, at 772
(1981). Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling
state interests. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
180. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984). The Supreme Court has also rejected associational challenges in the context of public funding to private education. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying tax exemption to nonprofit private school that prescribed and enforced racially
discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176
(1976) (anti-discrimination law does not violate constitutionally protected rights of free association of private,
commercially-operated, non-sectarian schools).
181. Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1089.
182. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1978).
183. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986).
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Rights Commission violated “no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of [the teacher’s] discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.” 184
As Caroline Mala Corbin notes, there is a disconnect in trying to propose a greater
protection of institutions compared to individuals, since institutions are composed by individuals in the first place, which makes their rights derivative from the primary rights
recognized to individuals. 185 If the association argument is pushed to its limits, it means
accepting that Smith limits the freedom of individuals to use forbidden substances in sacramental ceremonies, whereas it allows churches as associations to offer the forbidden
substances to their parishioners, and which clearly is outside the wording as well as the
spirit of Smith. 186 The Supreme Court’s attempt in Hosanna-Tabor to distinguish between “internal” and “external” 187 aspects of religious behavior is not very persuasive
either. The case did not concern the internal doctrinal questions of the church, but the
enforcement of the ADA for a qualified minister. 188 This can be considered as an “external” issue, since as developed earlier, the enforcement of disability anti-discrimination
law, in the absence of a doctrinal question, is a necessary condition which assures peaceful coexistence in a well-regulated society among different social groups, religious or
otherwise. The enforcement of disability anti-discrimination law belongs to the political
sphere, and is a rule upon which there can be an overlapping consensus even among religious doctrines which are in conflict. 189
In this case a balancing which would attribute equal weight to the two competing
concerns offering a medium of practical harmonization in the exercise of the two rights
is possible. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 190 the Court decided whether a statute violated the
Establishment Clause on the basis of a three-part test: the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 191 Anti-discrimination laws do not fail to meet the requirements of this test. Perich
did not seek reinstatement, but instead damages and in particular, “frontpay, backpay,
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.” 192 Reinstatement, imposing
the appointment of ministers by the state might echo government intervention in defining
who speaks for the church and co-defines its doctrine. However, reinstatement is left to
the discretion of the courts and it is not ordered if another employee is in place or if there
is a history of deterioration of relations between the parties, as in Hosanna-Tabor. 193

184. Id.
185. Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 54, at 1988-89.
186. Id. at 1989.
187. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012).
188. Id. at 710.
189. See infra Part II.B.
190. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
191. Id.
192. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 698.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(g)(1), 12117(a); see Leslie C. Griffin, Ordained Discrimination: The Cases
against the Ministerial Exception, UNIV. OF HOUSTON L. CTR., No. 2011-A-9, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1936073 [hereinafter Griffin, Ordained Discrimination].
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Courts are more likely to order damages, as this is the least intrusive measure to church
autonomy. 194 The Court should have awarded backpay and frontpay as well as compensatory damages. 195 A reasonable accommodation between two rights in conflict, church
autonomy versus disability rights, means compensation for the inability of exercising one
of the two. If the restitution is not possible in order to protect a core of church autonomy,
the diminution of the protection of the right not to be discriminated against in reference
the rights of others does not mean the vanishing of this right. Other duties and obligations can emerge like the one of compensation. 196 This is a possible “accommodation of
the clashing principles,” imposed by “flexibility, respect and humility.” 197
Both the expressive association claim concerning an employer as well as the establishment claim do not outweigh in this case the social interest of reintegration of the disabled; the social sensibility towards those who have been disadvantaged in their life due
to an accident or illness—a situation that can emerge in anyone’s life. 198 The interest in
enforcing disability anti-discrimination laws lies in protecting everyone in case of an accident. It is an interest in the heart of a well-ordered and just society whose rules pass the
universalizability test. 199 Just like the interest of the state to protect employees against
sexual harassment is a matter of the “highest priority,” 200 as courts have recognized in
the past, raising no First Amendment concerns, enforcement of disability antidiscrimination laws is an interest equally important in a “civilized society.” 201 In a series
“Reinstatement may not be appropriate . . . when the employer has exhibited such extreme hostility that, as a
practical matter, a productive and amicable working relationship would be impossible.” EEOC v. Prudential
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73; see, e.g., Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703
F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983); Cancellier v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319-20; Whittlesey v.
Union Carbide Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp.
352, 355 (D.N.H. 1981).
194. See Bollard v. Cali. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2004); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 79 (1997); see
also Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1126.
195. The Court could award backpay from the day that Perich was in position to provide services; see PETER
BLANCK, ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 316 (2009). Frontpay could cover a period taking into consideration “the availability of employment opportunities, the period within which one by reasonable
efforts may be re-employed, the employees work and life expectancy, the discount tables to determine the present value of future damages and other factors that are pertinent on prospective damages awards.” Prudential
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 763 F.2d at 1173 (citing Koyen v. Consol. Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 n.33
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)). Frontpay covers the period until which plaintiff finds a “comparable” job: “[A] position constitutes comparable employment if it would afford the plaintiff virtually identical promotional opportunities,
compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions and status as the position from which she was discharged.” Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994).
196. Monetary relief in lieu of reinstatement has been criticized as violating the freedom of religion of the
churches. See Lund, supra note 32, at 40. This argument makes sense only if one accepts that distinction between an issue pertaining to religious doctrine and one not pertaining is not possible. If, as proved earlier, this
distinction is possible, the impact upon freedom of religion is nonexistent. Giving frontpay merely compensates
for an illegal discrimination, which should not have taken place, while preserving church autonomy in its aspect of respecting its wish not to have reinstated a person with whom relations have been deteriorated.
197. Minow, supra note 35, at 847.
198. Cf. Battaglia, supra note 115. “[A]n expressive association interest can be overcome by a compelling
governmental interest in the enforcement of the anti-discrimination policy.” Id. at 395.
199. See infra, Part II.B.
200. EEOC v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982).
201. As the Ninth Circuit has held:
By practicing religion within our society, churches and their members necessarily undertake some of the burdens along with the benefits of civilized life. This will inevitably dis-
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of sexual harassment cases, courts have shown that they are in position to distinguish between substantive concerns in the selection and promotion of ministers protected by the
First Amendment and the legitimate interest of the state in protecting ministers against
sexual harassment. 202 Courts have established the distinction between “procedural entanglement” and “substantive entanglement.” When the latter is absent, “procedural entanglement considerations are reduced to the constitutional propriety of subjecting a church
to the expense and indignity of the civil legal process.” 203 This is an example of an entanglement “not sufficiently significant to violate the Establishment Clause.” 204 In other
words, the increased protection accorded to religious associations on the basis of the
First Amendment does not mean license to violate the legally protected rights of others if
a doctrinal issue is not at stake.
Instead of violating the First Amendment the argument can be and has been made
that recognizing a preferential status for religions to discriminate violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the extent that it means granting preferential
treatment by the government to a specific religion. 205 As P. Kurland has written, “the
freedom and separation clauses should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.” 206 In
this case, instead of imposing a burden, the government is granting a benefit concerning
the exemption from the application of its neutral laws of general applicability. 207 This
benefit can have as disparate impact discriminatory treatment of different religious
communities by the state, which is also contrary to the wording and the spirit of the Establishment Clause. According wide exemptions in the application of neutral laws of

tort hiring and firing incentives to some degree, but it is both misguided and futile to seek
to avoid all such effects […] The Bollard-Elvig rule, which leaves the decision whether
to hire or fire clergy with the religious institution, but subjects other decisions that may
have a collateral effect on employment to the authority of the civil courts, strikes me as
entirely workable.
Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 2004). Similarly,
while we recognize that applying any laws to religious institutions necessarily interferes
with the unfettered autonomy churches would otherwise enjoy, this sort of generalized
and diffuse concern for church autonomy, without more, does not exempt them from the
operation of secular laws. Otherwise, churches would be free from all of the secular legal
obligations that currently and routinely apply to them. […] At the same time, the strength
of the government’s interest, expressed in the text of Title VII, in protecting employees
against sexual harassment is difficult to overstate.
Bollard v. Cali. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999).
202. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
203. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949.
204. Id.
205. Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by
Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); KURLAND, supra note 157, at 22.
206. KURLAND, supra note 157, at 18.
207. See Tex. Monthly, Inc., v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (exemption from a state’s sales tax for the sale of
periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith consisting wholly of writings promulgating the
teaching of the faith violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution’s First Amendment where the state
denies a like exemption for other publications); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
(a Connecticut statute, “which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work
on their Sabbath, violates the establishment clause” of the First Amendment).
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general applicability on the basis of a freedom of association autonomy right leads to
discrimination between religious communities, “which by historical development or
modern design, are structured in ways that facilitated exemption claims” possessing “a
central authority or system of religious law maintained by an educated elite” compared to
religious communities, which do not possess “institutions of law-declaring authority.” 208
According to one interpretation, Smith did not aim at affecting the churches’ autonomy over their own affairs. 209 It is a matter of interpretation where the churches’ affairs end and where other compelling social interests begin. The liberal tradition has been
struggling to find the proper balance between protecting the defensive purposes of intermediate institutions such as churches, and the fact that they are powerful institutions
“mobiliz[ing] the deepest passions of believers in the course of creating institutions that
stand between the individuals and the state,” 210 having thus the potential to undermine
the rule of law. In this case, where the autonomy of the churches is not affected, since
their doctrinal uncontrollable criteria have applied in the substantive qualification of
Perich as a minister, the interest to protect her as a “disabled” person emerges. This interest must be recognized as an interest-limit to the arbitrariness of the church, which instead of protecting the “disabled” person, shields itself behind the idea of autonomy developed for other purposes; this allowed the church to escape the arbitrariness of the state
mingling in its internal affairs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 211 in order not
to meet its legal duties towards its employee. The reference to past state arbitrariness, in
order to negate the application of disability law, is misplaced, decontextualized and aims
at concealing the true crucial questions at stake. 212 In this case, the Church expresses the
majoritarian deformed opinion that Perich’s illness makes her a person unable to operate
as a cooperative member of society. 213 State intervention is legitimized in order to protect the minority status of Perich from the majoritarian social power that the religious institution expresses relegating her to the status of the “disabled,” who is unable to work
and thus to contribute to society.
The religious reason put forward by the church in order to justify Perich’s termination in reference to her unsuitability to be a minister, was that it was against the Lutheran
faith to be resolving disputes before civil courts, which seems to be pretextual in this
case. 214 In similar cases, courts should be able to distinguish whether the employer’s
stated nondiscriminatory ground for the action “is the true ground of the employer’s action rather than being a pretext for a decision based on some other undisclosed ground. . .

208. Lupu, supra note 51, at 423.
209. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. L. 25, 36 (2000); See Ministerial Exception, supra note 55, at 1783; EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (1996) (“[W]e cannot
believe that the Supreme Court in Smith intended to qualify this century-old affirmation of a church’s sovereignty over its own affairs.”).
210. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248
(1988).
211. See infra Part I.D.
212. Id.
213. See infra Part II.A.
214. Griffin, Ordained Discrimination, supra note 193.
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If it is the true ground and not a pretext, the case is over.” 215 Courts generally consider
that the investigation of whether the stated reason is mere pretext for a person’s termination “is not very threatening to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” 216 The religious context does not convert the retaliation question into a religious one; on the contrary the pretext even worsens Hosanna-Tabor’s position from the point of view of the
ADA, since its claim that Perich was spiritually unfit because she threatened legal action
is an admission of retaliation, which makes it liable under the law. 217 In the past, courts
did not accept the same argument of referring to violation of church doctrines, which
prohibit lawsuits by members against the church in order not to evaluate the retaliatory
action of religious institutions against employees, stressing the “compelling interest” of
the government in assuring equal employment opportunities as “the protection of employees who participate in EEOC proceedings from retaliatory job actions is essential to
accomplish the purpose of Title VII.” 218
The further consequences of the case allowing for discrimination in a number of
ways are not to be neglected either. The refusal of the state to enforce anti-discrimination
law for religious employees as it does for non-religious ones leads to a discriminatory
result between these two categories of employees. 219 At the same time, it leads to a discriminatory result for employers as it provides religious employers with more latitude
and bargaining power than their secular competitors. 220 Religious institutions are powerful social actors affecting consciences and thus perpetuating understandings about legitimacy in the exercise of social power inside civil society. 221 Michel Foucault has made
us conscious of the fact that power is omnipresent in society—we are permeated by it,
and it emanates from multiple sources. 222 Religious institutions are among the sources of
this power because religious affiliations are among the strongest in a person’s life. Religion fills a very important role, providing meaning and purpose. 223 A license to discriminate accorded to religious institutions can have detrimental effects perpetuating social

215. Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 2006).
216. Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Under the
ADEA, the factfinder does not ask if the employer’s stated reasons are fair or reasonable, but asks if they are
the actual reasons.”); see also Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 330 (3d
Cir. 1993) (In a case concerning a lay employee, the court noted “[a] conclusion that the religious reason did
not in fact motivate dismissal would not implicate entanglement since that conclusion implies nothing about the
validity of the religious doctrine or practice.”).
217. See Corbin, Irony of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 29, at 104.
218. EEOC v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982) (for a non-ministerial employee of
a non-profit religious publishing house, finding violation of Title VII for denying to a female employee monetary allowances paid to similarly situated male employees, and for terminating her employment in retaliation of
her filing charges and participating in proceedings under the Act).
219. Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1083.
220. Cf. Brant, supra note 115, at 277.
221. Id. Danchin, supra note 115; Lupu, supra note 51, at 408-09; Ira Lupu, Risky Business, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1303, 1318 (1988); Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court Access to
Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. L.J. 284 (1999).
222. See, MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 193 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
2d ed., 1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, Discipline & Punish].
223. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen trans., 1998) (analyzing that morality is also the result of power and religious institutions as the most powerful agents towards its formation providing meaning for human existence).
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stereotypes against which anti-discrimination laws are fighting. Religion might be overstepping its boundaries when religious institutions operate as employers in affecting people’s perceptions. State power should be legitimized in order to minimize the power of
these institutions upon weaker social actors, their employees. The very purpose of antidiscrimination law is to transform citizens’ consciousness, which to some extent can be
done through the use of coercion, 224 and which is legitimized in this case, since the protection of the rights of others are at stake. This is exactly the purpose and the role of the
state: arbitrating among differences in civil society protecting those, usually the weakest
social agents, whose rights have been violated from the power of the stronger social
agents assuring the conditions for a harmonious coexistence for everyone.
The implications of the ruling are uncertain, and thus concerning. As Winnifred
Sullivan notes, with the decision defending church autonomy, Hosanna-Tabor allows for
a priority of the rights of some Christians—the church officials—and a denial of rights to
other Christians, such as Perich; and this disregards the freedom from hierarchical church
discipline arguably accorded to American Christians by the religion clauses. 225 A broad
interpretation of the ministerial exception, such as the one in Hosanna-Tabor, merely reflects a model of “ceding sovereignty within certain areas, allowing them to act as small
state-like institutions, enforcing their own laws.” 226 It also echoes a model of statesupported churches with their own jurisdictional domains—the common model in Europe, from which Americans have been trying to distance themselves. 227 The result in
Hosanna-Tabor means that the state instead of enforcing its own law, enforces the rules
of the church on the specific labor relation which it has decided to regulate independently of the quality of the employer by enacting the ADA. The result of Hosanna-Tabor also allows religious employers to terminate their ministers for non-religious reasons. 228
Hosanna-Tabor results in a rule of the stronger to the detriment of the weaker, a situation
where might makes right, contrary to the universalizability rule and any conception of
justice whatsoever. 229 Accepting an exemption to the application of the antiretaliation
clauses of the ADA potentially opens Pandora’s Box, allowing religious organizations to
escape the application of the law. 230

D. An argument from history?
The Court, in order to defend the ministerial exception, referred to the importance
throughout the history of the United States of the protection of freedom of religion.
However, this interpretation is modeled to fit the general argument the Court makes, and

224. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 4 (1996).
225. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Church, THE IMMANENT FRAME (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/01/31/the-church/.
226. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Rethinking Secularism: Going to Law, THE IMMANENT FRAME (Oct. 13,
2011), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/10/13/going-to-law/.
227. Id.
228. Griffin, Religious Freedom, supra note 18.
229. See infra Part II.B.
230. Cf. Corbin, Irony of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 29, at 105.
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it is of dubious consistency with the issues at stake in defending freedom of religion during the founding era. The key motivation behind protecting freedom of religion during
that era was protecting minorities from the oppression of majorities. 231 This majority oppression of religious minorities was dominant in Europe and led to the flow of emigration to America. 232 Both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause were
conceived in order to protect the freedom of religion of minority religious communities
from interventions by majoritarian political decision-making. 233 The Free Exercise
Clause, which was meant to protect the weaker from the stronger, namely religious minorities from the protection of majorities, is now being used to protect the stronger to the
detriment of the weaker; that is religious institutions and their right to discriminate. 234 It
is an irony of history to use the dominant philosophy underlying the Constitution and the
First Amendment, the need to protect minorities by the power of majorities, in order to
refuse protecting another minority today, the minority of those labeled as “disabled”
from the power of the majority who has labeled them as such. 235 Anti-discrimination law
shows the tension between protecting a minority’s rights against the power of a majority,
a concern that permeates U.S. law ever since the foundation of the American republic.
James Madison’s idea of checks and balances, which is defining of the American constitutional order, was conceived on the basis of a similar concern for protecting minorities
from the power of political majorities. 236
The Hosanna-Tabor Court cites Thomas Curry’s book, The First Freedoms:

231. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); FORREST
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); MORTON
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES
IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1996).
232. SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 19-66 (1902); see also
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS
EQUALITY (2008).
233. Madison was initially against a Bill of Rights altogether, asserting that a “multiplicity of sects… is the
best and only security for religious liberty in any society. For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.” JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 149 (2008). When the Bill of Rights was eventually enacted as a concession of the Federalists to the Antifederalists, it was meant “to satisfy the Antifederalists, by explicitly stripping the national government of intrusive power in religious matters, and the Federalists, especially those in
New England, by maintaining considerable state autonomy in religion.” Id. at 155. The second great awakening
of religion between 1800 and 1830 was spurred by “the egalitarianism and jealousy fostered by revolutionary
ideals which convinced the average citizen that his opinion on religious matters was as valid as those of the
‘experts.’” Id. at 166. The Bill of Rights was developed by Madison as containing the common denominator of
liberties protected already at the state level; see Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S.
ILL. U. L.J., 251, 261 (1992). The very idea of a Bill of Rights, just as the content of the Federal Bill of Rights,
was developed first at the state level. For a presentation of the debates in the assemblies of the states, see JOHN
PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986);
and John P. Kaminski, Liberty versus Authority: The Eternal Conflict in Government, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J., 213,
222 (1992).
234. Cf. Rutherford, supra note 51, at 1083.
235. See infra Part II.A.
236. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Letter of June 8, 1789: Amendments to the Constitution,
in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., 1978). For an analysis, see HENRY STEELE
COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON: HOW EUROPE IMAGINED AND AMERICA REALIZED THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 234-35 (1977).
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Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment, 237 to make the argument that escaping from the control of the national church and exercising the right of
the churches to select their own ministers against the oppression of the state was the reason why many Puritans fled to New England. 238 The book cited in the case discusses the
omnipresent concern during the founding era for protecting minority religions: the multitude of different religious communities in colonial America led to a situation of tolerating dissenters “as a matter of principle.” 239 Unlike England, which excluded dissenters
from political rights and public life, in America they “were eligible to hold office” and
overall “fared much better than their counterparts in England.” 240 The Establishment
Clause was intended to limit the federal government, allowing the existing arrangements
of religious communities on the level of the states. However, the Founders had a different understanding of the term establishment compared to the one dominant today: 241 the
long debates during 1784, taking place at the level of states like Virginia, show that any
advantage towards a specific religion was seen as an “Establishment.” 242 Thomas Curry
notes that of the eleven states that ratified the First Amendment, “nine . . . adhered to the
viewpoint that . . . government[al] financial assistance to religion constituted an establishment of religion. . . .” 243 During the founding era when Americans were condemning
the idea of establishment, “they had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a definition
of a system.” 244 Thus, by the time of the revolution, all the colonies “were substantially
ready for the adoption of measures, which should make the severance of Church from
State complete:” those including according liberty to dissenting persuasions. 245 Thomas
Jefferson’s resolution of 1776 to strip the civil power of authority in matters of religion,
was aimed at “taking away all privileges and preeminence of one religion over another.” 246 The minority-majority dynamic is at the heart of all of these concerns in the
founding era.
The concern for protecting those who are different and whom the majority cannot
understand has been omnipresent throughout the history of the protection of freedom in
America and in particular religious freedom. That concern in our era means protecting
different minorities, such as the “disabled,” from the majoritarian power of religious in-

237. THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1986).
238. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012).
239. CURRY, supra note 237, at 78.
240. Id. at 79-80.
241. Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 407
(2002); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92 (2001). Establishments were not understood
based on European experience. An establishment meant “government aid and sponsorship of religion,” which
was accorded to various churches simultaneously. Id. at 101.
242. CURRY, supra note 237, at 147. The opponents of a tax for religion in Maryland and the people of Delaware and New Jersey held similar views. Id. at 160.
243. Id. at 220.
244. Id. at 211.
245. COBB, supra note 232, at 482.
246. CURRY, supra note 237, at 212. The author cites a series of similar conceptions in Virginia, South Carolina, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.
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stitutions among others potentially threatening them. 247 In Hosanna-Tabor, it was the
churches that were expressing majoritarian power in relegating to the category of the
“disabled” a number of citizens, on the basis of misunderstanding their abilities. 248 If the
churches were the weak actor that needed protection from the state in the founding era,
today it is the “disabled” who need protection. The churches are the ones who express
the oppression of the majority towards the minority of those called “disabled.” A consistent application of the concern of protecting minorities from powerful majorities, omnipresent throughout American constitutional history, means limiting the power of the
churches by enforcing disability anti-discrimination law.
II. DISABILITY ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION
Disability is a social construct, the result of the exercise of the power of discourse
of a majority upon a minority. If it is the case, given a dialectic relation that exists between the “is” and the “ought,” then an important obligation emerges to do away with
the social construct assuring the social integration of the persons called “disabled.” The
ADA has a very strong philosophical justification. Enforcing it is a compelling state interest, as the rights that it recognizes to the disabled are universalisable claims; claims
that can concentrate an overlapping consensus independently from a person’s comprehensive, metaphysical, religious, or other vision of the good.
A. Title VII, the ADA and the social construction of disability
The current disability civil rights paradigm started influencing U.S. government
policies in the 1970s, modeling the cause of the disabled in the line of the civil rights
cause won by the struggles of other disadvantaged social groups. 249 Title VII extended
the constitutional prohibition of discrimination to private employers, going beyond the
“state action” doctrine which limits the scope of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
actions by government on the basis of the Commerce Clause. 250 The Act involved “massive governmental intrusion into private economic choices.” 251 Title VII actions may be
brought in state or federal courts and the Act has served as a model for most state laws
prohibiting employment discrimination. 252 The ADA extended the same prohibitions to
cases of discrimination on the grounds of disability. 253 It applies to qualified individuals
able to perform the essential functions of the job as defined by the employer—and if this
employer happens to be a religious institution, by the uncontrollable religious criteria on

247. See infra Part II.A.
248. Id.
249. Basically, African-Americans and women. See BLANCK, supra note 195, at 6.
250. GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN & JOHN J. DONOHUE III, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THEORY
2 (3rd ed. 2012); see also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 439 (1991).
251. KOPPELMAN, supra note 224, at 2.
252. Brant, supra note 115, at 283.
253. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (1990).
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the basis of exercising its First Amendment rights. 254 The ADA’s goals are assuring
“equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency.” 255
The ADA incorporates the substantive jurisprudence developed under the previous
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 256 as well as the proof standards developed under Title VII,
and applies those rules to the broad class of individuals, employers, and unions covered
by Title VII. 257 The definition of what counts as “disability” is defined in the broadest
possible terms so that those protected by the statute represent an extremely heterogeneous group. The ADA requires employers not to take “adverse action” and obliges them to
make reasonable accommodations for qualified employees, unless the accommodation
imposes undue burden upon their business. 258 Failure to make a reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination: prevention and affirmative action are required at the same
time. 259 Unless employers can satisfy any of the statutory exemptions, they must “reasonably accommodate” their employees’ special needs. 260 The ADA prohibits an em254. Id. Congress found that:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society.
See also DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY
IN THE WORKPLACE 803 (8th ed. 2010).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). The National Council on the Handicapped (later named the National Council
on Disability) released its report, Toward Independence: An Assessment of Federal Laws and Programs Affecting Persons with Disabilities–With Legislative Recommendations: A Report to the President and to the
Congress of the United States, ISBN-0-936825-00-6 (Feb. 1, 1986), according to which:
The present and future costs of disability to the Nation are directly related to the degree
of success we attain in reducing existing barriers, both structural and attitudinal, and in
providing appropriate services to individuals with disabilities so that they may reach their
full potential and become more independent and self-sufficient.
Id. at 2; see also BLANCK, supra note 195, at 44.
256. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973).
257. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 891-92 (7th ed. 2009). The Rehabilitation Act aimed to promote and expand “employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for
[individuals with disabilities] and place such individuals in employment.” H.R. 8070, 93d Cong. § 2(8) (1973).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12112:
(b) Construction
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments
of the employee or applicant.
259. RUTHERGLEN & DONOHUE, supra note 250, at 779; see also Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1 (1996); Elizabeth F. Emens,
Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA . L. REV. 839, 877 (2008) (“[T]he ADA defines discrimination in terms
of accommodation.”).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
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ployer from retaliating “against any individual because such individual has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].” 261
The ADA was enacted in order to protect “qualified individuals” from employment
discrimination; that is, those
[W]ho, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be
given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall
be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. 262
The concept of “reasonable accommodation” affects both the determination of discrimination and the determination of qualifications. 263 Perich did fulfill all the substantive criteria to qualify as a “called teacher,” according to the requirements of the Lutheran Church. 264 The philosophy inspiring the concept of reasonable accommodation is
promoting “equal employment opportunity,” 265 reflecting the social model of disability
anti-discrimination law. It does not “require employers to grant people with disabilities
special treatment” as “employers are free to give the same type of accommodation to
nondisabled workers;” the employer must in any case determine after “examination of
both” the job requirements and the abilities of the person if an “aspect of the job could
reasonably be rearranged to permit” the person “to perform” the essential functions of
the job, provided that she is indeed the most qualified person to do the job. 266 Disability
leave, such as the one that Perich used, is a kind of reasonable accommodation destined
to facilitate reintegration of the disabled into the labor market. 267 As her doctor confirmed, following the leave and “with the assistance of medication,” she would be “fully
functional” to fulfill her teaching responsibilities. 268
The legislation expresses two basic values dominant in post-World War II American liberalism; the inherent dignity of the individual and the need for a rational and efficient economy. “Antidiscrimination law seeks to neutralize widespread forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based on inaccurate judgments about their
261. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
263. AVERY, supra note 254, at 804.
264. See infra Part II.A.
265. United States Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983),
in MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 677 (6th ed. 2003).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86
VA. L. REV. 397, 459 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination].
267. BLANCK, supra note 195, at 223.
268. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2010)
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. 2012).
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worth or capacities.” 269 In the case of disability, anti-discrimination law aims to assure
the social integration of the “disabled,” a goal all the more imperative if we consider that
every person runs the danger of becoming disabled due to accident or illness that can occur at some point in her life. Like all anti-discrimination law, the ADA aims at “removing misleading signals from the employers’ information mix” 270 when they are considering potential candidates for a job. The ADA expresses a compelling interest—the need to
protect a category of stigmatized citizens from “systematic disadvantage” and discrimination. 271
The purpose of anti-discrimination law is to transform cultural attitudes 272 and “existing social arrangements.” 273 This is a very important exercise of state coercion in
forming consciousness, preferences, and behavior necessitating a strong justification.
Anti-discrimination law is trying to do away with all the social constructs, whether they
operate on the symbolic or the institutional level, that perpetuate stigmatization, disadvantage and the general mistreatment of a certain group of citizens on the basis of a
characteristic seen as negative. In order to attack prejudice 274 against the “disabled,” a
“structural” and multilevel approach is necessary to “reorganize[] workplace structures
to minimize the risk that biases will limit opportunities. . . .” 275 In the case of the disabled, it is these social arrangements and constructs that prevent them from being productive and cooperative members of society.
In opposition to the “medical” model of disability, which used to be the dominant
paradigm to discuss disability and which focused on the elements of the person, seeing
some of her characteristics as “inherent [. . .] that should ideally be fixed,” 276 the “social”
model of disability focuses on the social circumstances which render a person “disabled.” 277 Inspired by this philosophy, this latter model of approaching disability concludes that some people are disabled because social arrangements make them seem so. 278
In different social circumstances they could be perfectly cooperative and productive so-

269. ROBERT POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW 10 (2001).
270. BLANCK, supra note 195, at 64.
271. Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 458.
272. KOPPELMAN, supra note 224, at 4.
273. POST, supra note 269, at 20; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE; INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 110-14 (1990); Len Barton, Sociology, Disability Studies and Education: Some Observations, in THE DISABILITY READER 62 (Tom Shakespeare ed., 1998).
274. See PIERRE-ANDRE TAGUIEFF, THE FORCE OF PREJUDICE: ON RACISM AND ITS DOUBLES (Hassan
Melehy trans., 2001); FACE AU RACISME: LES MOYENS D’AGIR TOME 1 (Pierre André Taguieff ed., 1991).
275. Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1,
15 (2006) (Bagenstos also expresses doubts as to the possibility that courts would police the structures employers adopt to promote workplace equality).
276. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 427. The medical model “locates the ‘problem’ of
disability within the individual and secondly it sees the causes of this problem as stemming from the functional
limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability.” MICHAEL OLIVER,
UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 32 (1996).
277. Id. at 19-42; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (2004); Adam M.
Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1255-56 (2007).
278. Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 85-87 (2007). Samuel Bagenstos
talks about “a socially assigned group status that tends to result in systematic disadvantage and deprivation of
opportunity.” Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 401.
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cial members. The existing social arrangements are made to reflect the needs of the majority of the population, making those who, on the basis of some difference, have different needs unable to operate and to contribute to others.
Difference is reinterpreted as disability and stigmatized by the power of the words
of the stronger to the detriment of the weaker. 279 Speaking and categorizing means exercising power, especially in a specific context of enunciation where the majority imposes
ways of thinking upon minorities. A difference is worded into a disadvantage on the basis of the power of a majority, which does things with its words. 280 The very definition of
a human attribute as an “impairment” making a person “unable” to operate in a specific
social setting is a function of social power. The exercise of the same social power leads
to the formation of criteria of esthetics, taste, and stigmatization of physical features seen
as “abnormal.” 281 The majority reinterprets the differences of a minority as “disabilities”
and forms a world where these differences prevent those having them from being creative and cooperative. The problem of disability is profoundly a tension between the
rights of a minority and political and social majorities, a concern towards which the U.S.
legal order has been very sensitive throughout American constitutional history. 282
Michel Foucault has written extensively on the elaboration of the concept of “normalization.” 283 The concept has two meanings: a normative one, describing what should
be an ought; and a descriptive one, describing an is. 284 Given the dialectic that exists between the is and the ought, the is, imposed by a powerful majority, produces normativity
and creates opinions and consciousnesses according to its precepts. What counts as
“normal” descriptively produces the normative conception of “normality” as well. A series of social needs, economic and systemic, have been producing the normativity of the
“normal” qualifying as normatively “abnormal,” a series of deviating attitudes imposing
homogeneity and the “shading of individual differences.” 285 The disabled constitute this
279. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1970); see
also MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith transl., 1972) (Foucault
discusses how name-giving is actually an exercise of power. Scientific discourse imposes order upon “nature”
by naming things).
280. This idea is due to a combination of J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962), and
PIERRE BOURDIEU, CE QUE PARLER VEUT DIRE: L’ECONOMIE DES ECHANGES LINGUISTIQUES (1982). Austin
focuses on the performativity of language in specific social contexts. Words have a locutory meaning; the
meaning that they have in a dictionary, and an illocutory meaning, that is, they produce results in specific contexts of communication. Bourdieu stresses the idea that the stronger a person is, the more things she can do
with her words on the basis of this performative aspect of speech. In a context of communication defined by the
social power of the majority, its use of words such as “disability” and “impairment” actually create in the world
of the contents of thought, the existence of these qualities; subordinating and disadvantaging an entire class of
people, as Justice Ginsburg notes in her concurring opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 494-95
(1999). Rae Langton makes a similar argument about women and pornography in Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 293 (1993).
281. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004); PIERRE
BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1985); Cass
R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL & POL. 22, 31-34 (1991).
282. See supra Part I.D.
283. FOUCAULT, Discipline & Punish, supra note 222, at 183; ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE
FRANCE 1974-1975 (Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni eds., Graham Burchell trans., 2003). For a discussion in the same spirit, see Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 441-45.
284. FOUCAULT, Discipline & Punish, supra note 222, at 213.
285. Id. at 184.
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category of citizens that have been oppressed due to the inability of the majority to understand them, seeing their difference existing at the level of the “is” as an unwanted difference on the level of the “ought.”
The will to subordinate also goes together with the will to discriminate; 286 the majority affirms its narcissism and its superiority, as well as its fear towards those who are
different, by subordinating them. Sartre’s 287 and Beauvoir’s 288 existentialism has appropriated the Hegelian idea 289 of the struggle of recognition and of the battle between different consciousnesses and subjectivities in trying to make sense of their lives and define
themselves. Every existent needs to be recognized by another existent as such: the self
needs to pose an Other and define herself in reference to that Other. Beauvoir has developed very eloquently how men have relegated women to the category of the inferior
while keeping them at the level of the existent—not annihilating them to the point of entirely turning them into objects. This is because it is the recognition of a human being
that is always indispensable to an existent in order to affirm himself.
The subjugation of the disabled has some similar elements, although it is difficult
to hold them accountable for complicity as Beauvoir does with women for their subordination. For the disabled, the fear and the impossibility to understand the difference led to
their subordination and the perpetuation of stigmatization. This happens in a way that
does not objectify them entirely but allows them to be existents in order to provide
recognition to the “normal,” those that need it the most.
Hegel’s insight is that in the struggle for recognition, a dialectical inversion takes
place at some point: 290 if we all need someone else’s recognition and if the strong majority needs to oppress a minority in order to affirm itself as superior, then in the end it
turns out to be the case that it is the majority that is enslaved in its narcissism permanently seeking glorification of its “normalness” by those who are different. It is those who
subordinate that are weaker in reality than the subordinated, because the first ones are
dependent on the admiration of those who are weaker, whereas the excluded and “abnormal” have nothing to lose.
If the construction of disability is based on the underestimation of the potential of
those seen as “disabled,” 291 then it is the context that needs to be properly adjusted in order to offer them the possibility to create, realize themselves, and contribute in return to
society. State coercion is thus needed to provide these social arrangements that will allow the “disabled” to show their abilities and thus gain respect and admiration for how
they can contribute to society just like every “non-disabled” person. Andrew Koppelman
presents three reasons for defending the anti-discrimination project; government impartiality, recognition of the individual value of every human being, and doing away with
material disadvantages that some citizens suffer by the perpetuation of the social con286. Cf. Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 418.
287. See, e.g., JEAN PAUL SARTRE, L’ETRE ET LE NEANT (1943).
288. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany Chevallier
trans., 2010).
289. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT §187 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977).
290. Id. at §193-96.
291. MINOW, supra note 273, at 321.
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structs that form prejudice against them. 292 At the same time it, aims at promoting the
self-fulfillment of an important category of citizens, indispensable to the promotion of
democracy and social peace. 293
The Supreme Court has proved in the past that it is very sensitive to similar considerations in a series of cases. In School Board of Nassau County, Florida et al. v.
Arline, the Court referred to the motivation of the ADA as being to dissipate “society’s
accumulated myths and fears about disability,” 294 as well as “archaic attitudes and
laws.” 295 In Olmstead v. L.C., the Court showed an intense concern in favor of the social
integration of persons with mental “disabilities” against the perpetuation of “unwarranted
assumptions that [these] persons [. . .] are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life.” 296 In Alexander v. Choate, the Court made a detailed presentation of
the motivation of the ADA, especially the fact that the handicapped person had been living “shunted aside, hidden and ignored,” 297 a fact that can no longer be tolerated. 298 The
ADA aims to attack the social constructs to which the Court refers in these cases. In Hosanna-Tabor, the rhetoric of the Supreme Court concerning the need to enforce the disability anti-discrimination law became too mild, neglecting how compelling an interest
this is, although it was possible to find a solution which would promote Perich’s reintegration in the job market, which would respect the core of the freedom of religion and
the autonomy of the Lutheran Church at the same time. 299 Granting frontpay would have
served both these purposes very well.

B. The philosophical foundations of disability anti-discrimination law
Enforcing disability anti-discrimination law is as compelling an interest as it is
universal. This can be proved through deontological moral reasoning or a consequentialist moral reasoning. Promoting the social integration of the “disabled” is something good
in itself, a priori, while benefiting everyone, based upon its consequences. Finding inspi-

292. KOPPELMAN, supra note 224, at 9.
293. Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 454.
294. School Bd. of Nassau Cnty. Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
295. Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
296. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1999). For the Court “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” See Brief for American
Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 20-22, Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98536), 1999 WL 134004. Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect: In order to receive
needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy, given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental
disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice. Id. at 6-7, 17.
297. Alexander v. Choate, 469. U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (citing 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971)).
298. Id. at 296 (citing Sen. Humphrey’s statement in 118 Cong. Rec. 525-26 (1974)). “And Senator
Cranston, the Acting Chairman of the Subcommittee that drafted § 504, described the Act as a response to
‘previous societal neglect.’” Id. (citing 119 Cong. Rec. 5880, 5883 (1973)). See also 118 Cong. Rec. 526
(1972) (statement of cosponsor Sen. Percy, describing the legislation leading to the 1973 Act as a national
commitment to eliminate the “glaring neglect” of the handicapped).
299. See supra part I.C.
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ration from the Hegelian perspective, 300 we can note that there is a dialectic relation between the is and the ought. 301 This means that if the very conception of “disability” is
socially constructed, then a responsibility emerges to do away with the construction allowing everyone to live fully flourishing lives. Once we realize that it is social power
that has imposed the social structures qualifying a category of individuals as “disabled”
to the extent that they cannot fit in the structures designed to reflect the standards of the
majority, a moral responsibility emerges for us to take measures doing away with the
structures that perpetuate the situation of force and injustice.
The justification of anti-discrimination law lies thus in the idea already enunciated by Aristotle according to which we must treat equal cases equally and unequal cases
unequally. 302 By extension, this means treating similar cases similarly and dissimilar
cases dissimilarly. Justice is a question of right balance and proportion in distributing
goods and possibilities, 303 as well as proper treatment of each specific case. From this
conception derives the idea that if the right proportion is not met then a responsibility
emerges for society to meet the right proportion. 304 This is a principle of justice which is
so fundamental that it applies to any conception of the state, independently of whether
we accept Aristotle’s vision of the state or not. 305 It is a principle consequent with contemporary constitutional liberalism, which does not consider the state as having a wide
moralizing role assuring how its citizens can live a moral life. 306 Even if the state does
not have a wide moralizing role, its very purpose of existence is to mediate between disagreements and to validate distributions of goods and possibilities settling conflicts. 307
Thus, the state should be legitimized to do away with this discourse which, exercising
violence, relegates a number of citizens to the category of “disabled” purely on the basis
of their differences, depriving them of the possibility to develop themselves in their own
way.
Especially in cases of disability, special protection is justified as anyone runs the
risk to become disabled due to an accident at some point in her life. The need to invent a
mechanism of coming up with impartial principles, or in other words, principles of justice that respect particularities while being just for everyone, is a recurrent concern
throughout a number of deontological theories. The universalizability test for Kant, the
idea of an overlapping consensus for Rawls, and the ideal speech situation for Habermas,
are examples of such mechanisms. For Kant, the legal rules which regulate our external
freedom, that is our freedom in social interaction, must meet the test of universalizabil-

300. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (J. Sibree trans., 1991).
301. Contra Samaha, supra note 277, at 1257-58 (distinguishing between the social origins of disability and
the normative conception of the need to change the circumstances that create the “disabled”).
302. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 1785 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
303. Id. at 1785.
304. Id. at 1786.
305. See THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, Politics 1987 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984).
306. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
307. The protection of negative liberties and settling disputes is essentially the role that Locke foresees for
the state; see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, POLITICAL WRITINGS, Second Treatise on Government: An Essay Concerning
the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government 324-27 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
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ity, which means that they must apply to everyone universally. 308 The principle of universalizability has its foundation in the idea that we must always treat each person as an
end and never simply as a means. 309
Rawls discusses the idea of a well-ordered society as a society whose citizens all
accept the same principles of justice, whose political and social institutions satisfy these
principles, and whose citizens comply with these institutions considering them as just. 310
For Rawls, these principles are political principles, not metaphysical—that is, they are
principles that can be agreed upon independently from the comprehensive religious philosophical and moral conceptions of each person. A society based on fair cooperation is
thus based on the idea that there are some terms that each participant may reasonably accept in a reciprocal way with everybody else and which serve everybody’s good. 311 In
attempting to define the fair terms of social cooperation, acceptable by free and equal
citizens in circumstances excluding coercion, force, deception and fraud. Rawls uses the
thought experiment of the “veil of ignorance” 312—that is of an abstraction of the contingencies of each person in the social world. 313 The social members under the veil of ignorance have, however, a rational capacity—that is they can have a conception first of their
own good, and second reasonable capacity, that is they can have a capacity for a sense of
justice which means accept the validity of rules that regulate interaction. Although Rawls
has been criticized for eliminating the elements constitutive of the identity of a person
which allow her to reason in the first place; 314 the purpose of his theory is to propose
principles of fairness articulating a conception of the Kantian idea of universalizability
that makes sense for us today. Under a veil of ignorance everyone would accept the enforcement of disability anti-discrimination law. If we did not know the circumstances
that define our existence, and “disability” is one such circumstance, then we would certainly accept the difference principle that is a society that is organized in a way that
meets the needs of all participants. In the case of disability, the veil of ignorance is already there—the average reasonable and rational person indeed does not know whether
she will become “disabled” one day. Disability can be the result of an accident that can
happen any moment in a person’s life. The members of any religious institution and the
believers of any religious faith would agree to the enforcement of disability antidiscrimination law concerning even the ministers of the church whose members they are,
as they cannot know whether one day they will become “disabled”.
Rawls rearticulates the liberal principle of legitimacy associating the exercise of
political power in accordance
308. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIQUE DES MOEURS, PREMIERE PARTIE, DOCTRINE DU DROIT 105 (Alexis
Philonenko ed., 1993); Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 122 (Hans
Reiss ed., 1970).
309. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W. Ellington trans.,
1993).
310. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 35 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, Political Liberalism].
311. Id. at 16.
312. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, Theory of Justice].
313. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, supra note 310, at 16.
314. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983);
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
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[W]ith a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason [. . .] Only a political conception of justice that all citizens might be reasonably expected
to endorse can serve as a basis of public reason and justification. 315
Rawls continues with the idea that questions about constitutional essentials and
matters of public justice are to be settled by appeal to political values alone, with respect
to which the political values have weight to override all other values that may come in
conflict with them. 316 Some of the ideas that people would agree upon in the original position are ideas that can concentrate an overlapping consensus even in our contemporary
pluralistic societies. People can affirm their comprehensive doctrine, such as a religious
doctrine, and yet keep it separate from the political realm. The political values cannot be
overridden as they govern “the basic framework of social life” which constitutes “the
very groundwork of our existence,” and “specify the fundamental terms of political and
social cooperation.” 317 Among these values are “equal political and civil liberty; fair
equality of opportunity; the values of economic reciprocity; the social bases of mutual
respect between citizens.” 318 Thus, the most “reasonable political conception of justice
for a democratic regime will be liberal, protecting the rights of the citizens as assigning
them a special priority and including measures to ensure that all citizens have sufficient
material means to make effective use of those basic rights.” 319 About these values, there
can be an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, even if
these doctrines are in conflict. Or better, they can win the support of every citizen addressing their reason, even if they adhere to conflicting comprehensive doctrines. 320
Agreement is possible in circumstances of reasonable pluralism. Provided that all citizens are willing to use their public reason, they will agree on the fundamental role of
some political values expressing the terms of fair social cooperation consistent with mutual respect of free and equal citizens. As Rawls notes, “any realistic idea of a wellordered society may seem to imply that some such compromise is involved.” 321
To extend Rawls’ thought further, it seems that there can be an overlapping consensus in favor of enforcing disability anti-discrimination law, coming from different religious or more generally comprehensive views. An overlapping consensus can also be

315. RAWLS, Theory of Justice, supra note 312, at 137.
316. Id. at 137-38.
317. Id. at 139.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 156-57.
320. For Rawls, it is possible for liberal principles of justice to cohere loosely with comprehensive views
since most people’s religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines are not seen by them as fully general and
comprehensive. Very often, their conception of justice is inspired by their comprehensive doctrines; when it is
not the case then they are willing to appreciate the good of their comprehensive doctrines modified and adjusted by the acceptance of some basic principles of justice. RAWLS, Theory of Justice, supra, note 312, at 160.
Some people are more willing to do this than the other way around.
321. Id. at 169.
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achieved around the idea that there must be some limits to the reach of religion upon the
political sphere as far as employment relations and labor law are concerned. What is
more, although Rawls puts aside temporarily and permanently “disabled” people as well
as people with mental disorders, 322 his theory can be read to include them as well. 323 This
conclusion is strengthened all the more if one realizes that everyone might become physically or mentally “disabled” someday due to an accident or illness. Every member of
every religious institution would agree upon the need to enforce disability antidiscrimination law, given the uncertainty of human life itself. Even the rational and reasonable agents of Rawls’s construction might become disabled someday, which means
that a well-ordered society that respects the liberty and the dignity of all its citizens is
one that foresees integrating them once something happens in their life that alters them
so profoundly as to deviate from the majority’s behavioral standards. Independently from
the religious, moral, and other comprehensive theory a person might be inspired by, there
would be an overlapping consensus that reintegration of those who are or become different at some point in their lives, assuring their possibility to become cooperative members
of society, is indeed a compelling interest even when religious ministers are concerned.
Enforcing disability anti-discrimination law is a compelling interest upon which there
can be overlapping consensus independently from one’s religious views even when religious ministers are concerned.
Habermas’ theory focuses on the fact that in everyday life human beings engage in
communicative practices aiming at coordinating their action, forming networks of interaction through processes of reaching understanding. 324 Anyone who engages in argument
presupposes two things: first, a real communication community whose member he has
become through a process of socialization and; and second, an ideal communication
community that would be, in principle, capable of adequately understanding the meaning
of his arguments and judging their truth in a definitive manner. 325 These presuppositions,
which are counterfactual, open up a perspective which allows possibilities that go beyond local practices of justification and transcends the provinciality of contexts. Therefore, they can do justice to context transcending validity claims. 326 This allows Habermas
to come up with a methodological fiction—a thought experiment of an ideal communication community—which presents itself as a model of pure communicative sociation. The
only available mechanism of self-organization is the instrument of discursive opinion.
The community is supposed to be able to settle all conflicts without violence and only
with the force of the best argument. 327

322. Id. at 20.
323. The veil of ignorance cannot include those who are right now mentally handicapped. However, there
are “disabled” who can develop the two capacities, the reasonable and the rational.
324. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY 18 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
325. Id. at 322.
326. Id. at 323.
327. This conception does not detach discursive processes of reaching understanding from their situation in
specific cultural and social contexts, the lifeworld. Although these contexts condition the actors’ latitude for
action and interpretation, the actors are not unilaterally defined by the lifeworld, rather, they act back on it. The
lifeworld itself is fluid and self-reproducing through communicative action, just as our laws are produced and
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The idealizations of pure communication provide a suitable foil for bringing out
the functionally necessary resources for communications in general. The ideal model abstracts from the unequal distribution of attention, competences, and knowledge within a
public. It is also blind to dogma, egocentrism, weakness of will, irrationality, and selfdeception on the part of the participants. 328 Habermas acknowledges the systemic constraints and accidental inequalities in the distribution of individual abilities. However, he
conceives this model as merely a methodological fiction aimed at displaying the unavoidable inertial features of societal complexity. By its very nature, positive law serves
to reduce social complexity. Through idealizations, legal rules can compensate for the
limited coordinating power of moral norms. The basic rights and principles of government by law can be understood as steps towards reducing the unavoidable complexity
evident in the necessary deviations from the model of pure communication. In opposition
to the Marxist view of the law as the result of class power, 329 and to the Weberian pessimism concerning the power of the self-referential bureaucratic systems to create legality
without legitimacy, 330 for Habermas, the law in a contemporary representative democracy also has a liberating function. There is a direct communication between the political
public sphere and civil society in view of amending and reamending our legal institutions. The law is, for Habermas, fluid and defined in the numerous spheres of our communicative action, which are overlapping. Every day we participate in numerous public
forums exchanging ideas and these ideas inevitably affect social evolution, our conception of justice, and finally, our legal rules. The constitutional state has a “dynamic character;” it is an unfinished project whose purpose is to realize the system of rights anew in
changing circumstances. 331
On the basis of a Habermassian ideal speech situation where only the force of the
best argument applies, disability anti-discrimination law would be seen as an indispensable medium in view of promoting integration of those who are different. 332 At the same
time, the law is indeed a medium that assures recognition and a voice to those who are
excluded by the violence of words and have been relegated to the category of the “disabled.” For Habermas, the law is at the same time the product of power while having a
liberating potential allowing, through the proper legal rules, everyone’s development and
neutralizing the power and inequalities at play inside civil society. In other words, the
state, through the law, can constrain actors inside civil society if by using their institutional economic and other kind of power they violate others rights to liberty and free development. If one considers that it is power that has led to the social arrangements that
make someone appear as “disabled,” then the costs for reasonable accommodations ap-

reproduced following deliberation in the public sphere.
328. Id. at 325.
329. See, e.g., Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 187 (Robert C. Tucker ed.,
2d ed. 1972).
330. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 220 (H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills eds., 1946).
331. HABERMAS, supra note 324, at 383.
332. Concerning who can participate in the discussions the same idea applies as for Rawls, see RAWLS, Political Liberalism, supra note 310.
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pear as an element of corrective justice, 333 a measure due to those excluded from the job
market on the basis of force and majority preferences. There is a strong principle of justice in favor of reasonable accommodations. On the basis of all these mechanisms of
universalizability of the legal rules that regulate our interaction as social beings, the
recognition of the rights of a minority—in this case the disabled—against the power of
the majority, in this case, the “normal” and non-disabled, would be justified. Independently from one’s religion or faith, there can be agreement on the basis of an ideal
speech situation for enforcing anti-discrimination law even when religious ministers are
concerned.
Admittedly, Rawls’s theory, just like Kant’s and Habermas’, is not exempt of critiques which stress among others the role of the irrational in humans. Human beings do
not always have the ability to filter through their reason all their prejudice and think in
terms of impartiality. 334 Unconsciously, or consciously, a reasonable consensus might
not be possible. Other critiques have stressed the importance of community and belonging towards the very possibility of humans to think rationally. 335 Social class also affects
how we think and interact with others. A foucauldian critique would stress the omnipresence of power, which makes the very possibility of a free equal and rational being almost
impossible. 336 The theory’s powerful optimism, though, is very strong, and despite the
difficulties of its implementation, it does not lose its appeal as an ideal. As Kant has famously noted, the fact that a theory might seem at times impracticable does not mean
that it does not have a value as an ideal. 337
Even on the basis of a consequentialist-utilitarian moral reasoning, the need to integrate the “disabled” can be justified. This model evaluates the moral quality of an action on the basis of its positive consequences; 338 the beneficial consequences for everyone of allowing the “disabled” to become cooperative members. Studies have stressed
the economic efficiency of giving opportunities to “disabled” workers. 339 They very of333. For an analysis of the obligation to integrate the disabled as an element of corrective justice, see Samaha, supra note 277.
334. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Wiensheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., 2d ed. 2004) (analyzing the role of conscious and unconscious prejudice in any effort to understand the
world).
335. Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL & PUB. AFFAIRS 308, 313-14 (1987).
336. See, e.g., 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEXUALITY 94
(Robert Hurley trans., 1990).
337. See KANT, supra note 308, at 63.
338. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988); DAVID WIGGINS, ETHICS: TWELVE
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALITY 207 (2006).
339. According to the findings of a 2007 cost-benefit study:
[E]mployees with disabilities have much to contribute to the labor force:
· Participants with disabilities from the retail and hospitality sectors stayed on the job
longer than participants without disabilities.
· Across all sectors, participants with disabilities had fewer scheduled absences than those
without disabilities.
· Retail participants with disabilities had fewer days of unscheduled absences than those
without disabilities.
· Regardless of sector, participants with and without disabilities had nearly identical job
performance ratings.
· Across all sectors, the difference in amount of supervision required ratings were rela-
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ten show “higher productivity, greater dedication, and better identification of qualified
candidates for promotion.” 340 Employment decreases the need for government spending
to support these individuals, and increases their tax revenues, avoiding spreading the cost
for their subsistence among the public. 341 Their productive power outweighs the prima
facie cost of the reasonable accommodations required by the ADA. 342 Third parties also
benefit from reasonable accommodations changing attitudes towards disability itself. 343
Integration of the “disabled” in the labor market is indispensable in order to brake the
vicious cycle of resignation and “the lack of motivation to invest in their human capital,” 344 which reinforces stigma and marginalization. 345 The enforcement of disability
anti-discrimination law benefits everyone from the productive use of the talents of this
important category of citizens; employers can obtain a wider labor force among which
they will be able to make better choices. 346 Steven Hawking, one of the greatest physicists of all time needs technical assistance in order to move, and Beethoven, one of the
greatest composers in history, was deaf. Self-sufficiency leads to the possibility of responsible exercise of citizenship. 347 According to the “radical social model,” excluding
the “disabled” from the job market disables everyone as it perpetuates a deformed way of
experiencing reality. 348
Work is a fundamental medium of self-fulfillment and social integration. It has a
profoundly liberating potential for providing meaning in a person’s life. Marx and Hegel
noted how important labor and creation is for humans. Humans work in order to satisfy
their needs of survival, but also their spiritual needs of contributing to others and finding
accomplishment through their creations. 349 Satisfying one’s needs conditions the mutual

tively minor among participants with and without disabilities.
· The number of worker’s compensation claims of retail participants with and without
disabilities were equivalent.
DePaul Univ. & Ill. Dep’t of Com. & Econ. Opportunity, Exploring the Bottom Line: A Study on the Costs and
Benefits of Workers with Disabilities (2007).
340. Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 105
(2003) (citations omitted).
341. During congressional hearings for the ADA, Rep. Miller noted:
[We] must bear the economic costs to our society when the disabled are prevented from
fully participating in education, jobs and community life. If the disabled are locked out of
jobs, then society must bear the cost of maintaining these individuals and their families –
families that otherwise would be self supporting and paying taxes.
BLANCK, supra note 195, at 60 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H2447-448, daily ed., May 17, 1990; Stein, supra note
340, at 106 (citations omitted)).
342. See BLANCK, supra note 195, at 66 (analyzing a series of evaluation of costs, profits and the improvement of corporate culture and attitudes which may motivate using accommodations).
343. Emens, supra note 259, at 910-11.
344. Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 266, at 464.
345. See also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 259, at 22-24 (noting that the ADA caused employers to
adopt practices that efficiency should have caused them to adopt earlier).
346. Stein, supra note 340, at 106-07 (containing a wonderful critique of objections to disability antidiscrimination law in reference to the neoclassical economic model).
347. Id. at 106.
348. Emens, supra note 259, at 889.
349. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 229 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans.,
1991); Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1848, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
67-105 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).
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relations between individuals, leading them to mutual recognition by making them realize that their individual needs are in reality social needs, 350 which can be fulfilled
through dependence and reciprocity. 351 For Hegel, human freedom lies in the realization
that by a dialectical movement, when a person satisfies her own needs, she realizes that
she also produces and contributes to the enjoyment of others. 352 The realization that human beings are participants in civil society, satisfying their needs and those of others, is
constitutive of a person’s self-determination; through the mediation of the satisfaction of
one’s needs with the universal social needs and through the realization of social duties,
people find “recognition in their own eyes and in the eyes of others.” 353 Marx also
stressed the point that the way people relate to one another is defined by the way they
obtain their means of subsistence. 354 Thus, denying a person the opportunity to contribute as a social member in the labor force means depriving her the possibility to discover
and realize herself by contributing to others. It also deprives her of the possibility to develop and experience self-respect as a cooperative and contributing member of the same
society. 355
Anti-discrimination law embodies a constitutional value of equal protection explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and implicit in the Fifth Amendment. Understood in this
way, measures promoting anti-discrimination as giving a positive advantage should be
submitted by the Supreme Court to heightened scrutiny, as all cases of discrimination of
minorities. 356 However, the need to reorient and reconstruct the social surroundings
which produce the deformed category of understanding called “disability” can be articulated as a liberty right. The existing social context prevents those seen as “disabled” from
the possibility to live a meaningful life. Thus it deprives them the possibility and the liberty to live their life in their own terms, and therefore, it is a core of negative freedom
that is being violated by social circumstances. Kenji Yoshino recently enunciated the
idea that among equal protection claims, those that can be phrased as liberty claims are
worthy of protection. 357 Liberty claims are more persuasive, whereas equal protection
claims “tend to stress distinctions, even as they ask [. . .] to overcome those distinctions,”
committing a performative contradiction. 358 The liberty claims do not essentialize identities, emphasizing instead what all citizens have in common. 359 The fact that the state, by
claiming to promote equality in order to protect liberty, is actually enforcing equality by
merely limiting liberty, makes traditional equality claims not as persuasive because they
are seen as implying limitation of liberty. According to this way of thinking, gay marriage, for example, should be defended not in terms of equality but in terms of liberty; its

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

HEGEL, supra note 349, at 229.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 238.
Marx, supra note 349, at 147-200.
RAWLS, Theory of Justice, supra note 312, at 318.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 794 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 796.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss1/3

50

TOURKOCHORITI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/10/2013 7:22 PM

Tourkochoriti: Revisiting Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC: The Road Not Taken
REVISITING HOSANNA-TABOR v. EEOC

97

non–recognition violates the rights of homosexuals to happiness and to give sense and
meaning to their lives. The cause of the disabled can also be phrased as a liberty argument, not only as an equality argument; the need to protect the rights of the disabled to
live a meaningful life is a liberty right. It means allowing the minority of citizens labeled
“disabled” to give meaning in their lives through their work and their feeling that they
participate as cooperative members in a society that collectively satisfies its needs. The
very characterization of “disabled” is imposed by a majority upon a minority because of
the fear and the impossibility to understand their differences. The concern to protect minorities from powerful majorities has been central throughout U.S. constitutional history.
It is the need to protect a person from the negative consequences of an accident that
might happen in her life leaving her disabled. The social model encourages social integration, cooperation, and reinsertion of the disabled into the workforce, making them feel
worthy and participative members of society, increasing their self-respect, instead of
making them feel as beneficiaries of the charity of others. Disability leave is a medium
that facilitates the social integration of the disabled. The importance of enforcing disability anti-discrimination law lies in the idea that everyone runs the risk of becoming disabled following an accident. A well-ordered society accepts as a principle of justice the
idea of making up for those who have been disadvantaged due to accident or illness.
Thus, Perich had in Hosanna-Tabor, a very strong legal and philosophical claim whose
protection could take place in a way that would have a small impact upon the autonomy
of the church as no doctrinal issue was at stake. Interpreting the ministerial exception as
covering only matters of religious doctrine that the courts are unable to control is possible and appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Perich was exercising a legally protected right. At the same time, this right had a
very strong philosophical justification on the basis of a deontological reasoning as well
as on the basis of a consequentialist reasoning. Integration of the “disabled” is a compelling interest, which creates no “balkanization” fears. 360 In a series of affirmative action
cases, Justices have been expressing fears that giving preferential treatment to a specific
social group might be threatening to social cohesion by perpetuating categorization of
citizens and creating feelings of injustice to those belonging to social categories not being advantaged. 361 The delicate questions that courts in the U.S. have confronted were
doing justice to historically disadvantaged minorities, while at the same time choosing
the mediums that promote social cohesion and do not reproduce prejudice. This is not a
justifiable fear for the case of the disabled, as everyone has to benefit from their integration in the labor market. Perich also had a very strong legal claim since the ADA is a
neutral law of general applicability, which should have been enforced in Hosanna-Tabor
on the basis of Smith. Under Hosanna-Tabor, a priest, already appointed according to the
360. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011).
361. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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uncontrollable substantive criteria as a qualified minister, who due to an accident remains disabled physically and needs to use a wheelchair, can be terminated by his church
at will, without enjoying the protection of disability anti-discrimination law. This result
strikes as profoundly unjust, being contrary to the requirement of universalizability,
which must characterize the rules of any well-ordered society.
The widespread religiosity in the U.S. and the distrust towards state power 362 create a presumption in favor of protecting religious freedom, even when no serious threats
to it are at stake. Tocqueville had noted that religion in America furnishes the moral
bond necessary to substitute for the loosening of the political bond. 363 Normative pluralism, 364 which should be acceptable as the need to reconcile conflicting moral obligations
coming from the quality of being a citizen and a member of a religious community,
should also be limited when religious imperatives are in such open conflict with specific
principles of justice, such as the universalizability rule and the rule of not harming others. A religious community, which is supposed to express the quintessence of values of
justice, should have been itself more sensitive to accommodating the “disability” needs
of one of its pastors. The Lutheran Church failed to respect humanity in the face of one
of its members. The Kantian universalizability rule rearticulated by Rawls in the idea of
the consensus of the reasonable and rational persons under the veil of ignorance, and the
idea or the overlapping consensus within our existing political societies is a new enunciation of a basic principle of justice, existing in all normative and other systems of morals
throughout history—the long Judeo-Christian cultural history, as much as the Greek and
Roman. 365 It is a principle upon which there is an overlapping consensus and a principle
that is by definition the reason of existence of every legal system. We have always
known that the liberty of a person stops where the liberty of another person begins, and
that we must treat every person always as an end and never as a means; 366 otherwise social coexistence would be impossible. In the principle of universalizability, philosophers
from Kant to Rawls and Habermas are merely restating a principle of justice, which is
dictated by common sense to every socialized human being. At the same time, it is a legal principle, which exists in all legal cultures and all the more in the U.S. legal culture. 367 The state is thus legitimized to take measures towards its implementation when
the principle is violated by an actor of civil society which harms another one, even when
the principle is forgotten by a religious group whose it should be the quintessence.
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